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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Feminization of labour, gendered jobs and social change 
 
 
Batam, an island of 415 sq km, is situated in the north-west of Indonesia. 
Located about 21 km away from Singapore, it is approximately two-thirds the 
size of its neighbour with a population of only 155,000 people (Royle, 1997). 
This Singapore-Indonesian border zone became a centre of activity in the 
early 1990s as both countries strengthened their bilateral ties, with Singapore 
helping to direct western transnational corporation investments to Batam, 
especially towards the manufacturing sector, at a time of rapid change in 
Indonesia as it strove to modernize its economy, moving towards 
industrialization. In exchange, Singapore retains an important role for its own 
firms in the provision of management and administrative functions, as it has 





Figure 1.1: Singapore and the Riau Islands (Grundy-Warr et al, 1999) 
 
 
Batam‘s designation as a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) or Export Processing Zone 
(EPZ) attracted TNC investments which created thousands of jobs as they set 
up their factories in its industrial estates. Mack (2004) argues that in areas 
legally cordoned off from the host nation, EPZs offer conditions which are 
amenable to offshore investment and production, such as duty-free import of 
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parts and export of finished products, to structures that allow companies to 
avoid restrictive labour legislation. EPZs treat ‗labour‘ as a generic component 
and in their bid to attract investment, host countries may even restrict the 
autonomy of workers by employing strict legislation against unionization.  
 
Part of the marketed image of an EPZ rests on its ―docile‖ and 
―nimble-fingered‖ female labourers, universally considered to be 
more desirable employees than men. Generally recruited from 
rural, agricultural backgrounds, these young (and usually 
unmarried) women are classified as ―unskilled‖, and thus easily 
replaceable. 
(Mack, 2004: 157) 
 
 
Why did the manufacturing of labour-intensive consumer goods pass into the 
hands of developing countries in Asia? Also, how did feminization of labour 
especially in the manufacturing sector of EPZs occur? The main argument 
accounting for the proliferation of female factory workers is that they are a 
source of cheap labour. This rests upon various assumptions: firstly, society is 
organized upon the patriarchal order where men are seen to be the main 
breadwinners. When women did enter formal employment, an unequal pay 
structure was established according to the notion that men‘s wages must 
support a family while wage-earning women are partly supported by men or at 
least have only themselves to support. Secondly, the jobs that the women 
entered are poorly compensated compared to the jobs that men entered as 
women are seen to be doing work that is of a lower order, performing tasks 
such as sewing, that they would have performed while maintaining the 
household. Since traditionally women‘s household work was never valued 
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monetarily, similar work in the formal sector is poorly recompensed (Kaur, 
1998). These arguments will be revisited and critiqued in later chapters. 
 
 




This thesis aims to deconstruct gender and sexuality with regard to female 
migrant factory workers in Batam by acknowledging the discursive formation 
of gender, which affects ‗doing gender‘ when dealing with the issue of women 
and work. The thesis is largely centred on the theme of gendered work and 
labour control. Firstly, based in a literature review, I summarize and argue that 
the feminization of labour in Indonesia is facilitated by institutions at three 
different levels: the state‘s ideology on labour as well as its discourse on 
women, gendered recruitment practices at the factory level, as well as supply 
factors that mobilize women that make them appealing towards employers as 
ideal workers. In the above analysis, I take on the Foucauldian view that 
‗discourse‘ produces its subjects, and also discuss how gendered subjects are 
constructed relationally through discourse, where male and female workers 
are produced relationally through a series of binary oppositions. To capture 
this idea, I will illustrate how the Indonesian discourse on women, via the 
kodrat filters affects the management discourse on recruitment practices. My 
interviews with various factory managers show that the management 
themselves have internalized taken-for-granted notions that there are certain 
innate traits that women possess that make them ideal factory workers – 
careful, disciplined, docile, diligent and embodying the tasks traditionally 
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carried out by women; as compared to men who are careless, lazy, and 
undisciplined. What then are the implications of such stereotypes? Secondly, I 
will highlight how these women, despite being stereotyped by their employers 
as docile, empower themselves by employing various techniques of 
resistance against the subordinating powers of the capitalist discipline. Such 
techniques range from decreasing their productivity or declining to perform 
overtime hours, to mass absenteeism, and lastly being on strike. How then do 






I shall begin with a wide literature review of key works by various authors on 
themes such as -- feminization of global manufacturing (Saptari, 2000; Kaur, 
2004; Caraway, 2007), industrialization in Indonesia (Royle, 1997), gender 
and migration (Chant & Radcliffe, 1992; Mahler & Pessar, 2006), female 
migration in Indonesia (Hugo, 1992; Elmhirst, 2002), the construction of 
feminine subjects in Indonesia (Sears, 1996; Tiwon, 1996; Devasahayam et 
al, 2004) and also women and factory work in Indonesia (Ong, 1987; Wolf, 
1992; Tjandraningsih, 2000; Mack, 2004; Ford & Lyons, 2006; Warouw, 2008; 
Ford & Parker, 2008). 
 
As part of my fieldwork, I conducted qualitative interviews with five 
managers of five different factories on Batam, and posed them questions on 
the development of Batam, the profile of their workers, as well as their hiring 
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policies, remuneration packages and the working conditions of their workers. 
Their factories varied in terms of production, ranging from electronic products 
such as semiconductors and television tuners to garments and also checking 
finished products for quality control. My informants told me that a high 
proportion of their workers, almost 80 per cent of their production operators, 
are females. Managers also revealed that their workers may sometimes show 
signs of dissatisfaction with the management, mainly due to salary issues. 
These issues will be further discussed in my paper. 
 
Interviews were also conducted with several female factory workers in 
the same factory, PT Permata, a Japanese firm which manufactures hard 
disks for electronic devices, PT Permata and themes centred upon their 





One of the first issues when considering the topic is to deconstruct gender 
and gender identity with regards to work and labour control. Mahler & Pessar 
(2006) offers a very succinct definition of approaching gender as a subject 
under scrutiny: 
 
Gender is the meaning people give to the biological reality that there 
are two sexes. It is a human intervention that organizes our behaviour 
and thought, not as a set of static structures or roles but as an 
ongoing process. People do ―gender work‖; through practices and 
discourses they negotiate relationships and conflicting interests. 
Conceptualizing gender as a process yields a more praxis-oriented 
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perspective wherein gender identities, relations, and ideologies are 
fluid, not fixed. 
(Mahler & Passer, 2006: 29) 
 
 
Therefore, in relation to my research topic, an omnipresent fact of industrial 
life is the categorization of jobs in factories as ―men‘s work‖ and ―women‘s 
work‖, since men and women seldom do the same jobs. Often, the literature 
suggests that such profound gender segregation is rooted in the gendered 
discourse of work. This research is guided by Caraway‘s (2007) conception of 
‗gendered discourses of work‘. Caraway argues that ‗the gendered worker on 
the shop floor is created in part through the discourses produced by the 
management about gendered workers‘. 
 
From a Foucauldian perspective the issue is not whether the women 
are patient, disciplined, and diligent but that the subject of the woman 
worker as patient, disciplined, and diligent worker is produced 
through discourse. 
(Caraway, 2007: 30)  
 
 
Post-structural feminists have called for special attention to be paid to how 
gendered subjects are created relationally through discourse: the 
dichotomous relations between male and female workers. This view is 
reproduced several times in most of the works that I reviewed on women and 
factory work. Therefore, this research is very much guided by Caraway‘s tool 
of inquiry, where she adopted a ‗syncretic conceptualization of gendered 
discourses of work‘ combining Foucault‘s (1990) conception of discourse and 




Research Findings and Plan of the Thesis 
 
 
Chapter 2 attunes the reader to the historical emergence of Indonesia‘s export 
oriented industrialization strategy and how this has affected labour patterns. 
Indonesia was described in the 1960s as being one of the least industrialized 
countries in the world for its size (Hill, 1990) and the manufacturing sector 
only totalled an estimate of 840,000 workers in 1971. During the 1980s, 
however, due to trade liberalization and deregulation policies, Indonesia 
moved from being a negligible exporter of manufactures to a significant 
supplier. Statistics show that in 1980, manufactures generated less than 3 
percent of total exports; however by 1992 they were nearly 50 percent (Hill, 
1996:810). This expansion was facilitated by a series of trade reforms, during 
the New Order years of 1966 to 1997/8. Indonesia moved away from a 
protectionist strategy of protecting its domestic market and towards an export 
oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy as the country, which is a major oil 
exporter, coped with the collapse of the price of oil. This chapter highlights 
Indonesia‘s rise as an export manufacturer and the concomitant effects on the 
changes in labour structure i.e. – the feminization of labour and its resultant 
effects, such as the patterns of migration and concerns on exploitative nature 
of female factory work. 
 
This chapter also later highlights how Batam features as part of 
Indonesia‘s strategy to attract an inflow of large foreign direct investment 
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(FDI) as an export processing zone (or also called ‗bonded zone‘ by 
commentators on the Indonesian economy) in order to leverage on its 
comparative advantage in export manufacturing. Since this research is largely 
centred on themes of gendered work and labour control, this chapter also 
reviews the feminist literature on women‘s work in export processing zones 
and highlights the waves of feminization of the manufacturing industry as 
posited by Caraway (2007). 
 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 turn attention to an in-depth analysis of the case 
in point, Batam, specifically on, BatamIndo Industrial Park. Chapter 3 outlines 
the profile of factory workers in the manufacturing sector, who are mostly 
young, single females, between the ages of 18-22. Based on my in-depth field 
interviews with the women, they relate to me their migratory experience and 
the anxieties that they face as well as how they cope with and mitigate these 
anxieties. I argue that based on the everyday experiences that these women 
share as a community of migrant workers, it allows them to create and share a 
‗structure of feeling‘ where they create their own identity via their own feelings 
and emotions. Examples of such feelings are bareng (togetherness), 
kebebasan (freedom) and kangen (homesickness) and these women cope 
with these anxieties by being each other‘s social support system. 
 
Chapter 4 demonstrates the importance of bringing gender to the core 
and not to fall simply into the trap of tokenism when discussing gender by 
simply inserting sex as a variable. The understanding of the Foucauldian 
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concept of the gendered discourses of work is introduced to show how this 
leads to gendered outcomes, as again portrayed by Caraway, as this is 
pivotal towards the understanding of women and labour in factories. 
Therefore, before we can see the effects of industrialization on work and 
labour control, we must firstly explore the very operation of gender and 
explore how it is articulated with other axes of differentiation in complex ways. 
I argue that the stereotypical, gendered image of the nimble-fingered, docile 
female worker is articulated at different levels, Firstly, the ideological level of 
the state‘s discourse on gender via the notion of kodrat wanita (women‘s 
nature). This section will highlight the Indonesian discourse on gender as 
posited by scholars such as Suryakusuma (1987), Blackwood (1995), Tiwon 
(1996), Wieringa (2003) and Caraway (2007). The next level where the 
construction of the ideal female factory worker is articulated is at the level of 
recruitment practices by the management. Management believes that women 
possess certain characteristics that make them better workers at certain tasks 
than men. Therefore, in order to understand employers‘ preference to employ 
women as production operators in their factories, we must consider the 
gendered discourses of work. I take on the view that ‗discourse‘ (Foucault, 
1990) produces its subjects, and also discuss how gendered subjects are 
constructed relationally through discourse, where male and female workers 
are produced relationally through a series of binary oppositions (Caraway, 
2007). To capture this idea, my interviews with various factory managers 
show that they have internalized as a fact that there are certain innate traits 
that women possess that make them ideal factory workers – careful, 
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disciplined, docile and diligent, embodying the tasks traditionally carried out 
by women; as compared to men who are careless, lazy, and undisciplined. 
Lastly, the process of feminization in Indonesia finally took off in the 1980s 
onwards due to the increased supply of labour – the availability of qualified, 
educated female labour, attributed mostly to the New Order education policies 
which improved the educational levels of women. All the above factors 
contributed significantly to the process of feminization in Indonesia between 
the years 1971 to 1994, the percentage of women involved in manufacturing 
work increased substantially from 37 per cent to 51 per cent (Caraway, 2007). 
  
Chapter 5 centres the issue of resistance in relation or in tension with 
the agency of the feminine subject. Here, I conceptualize the definition of 
resistance, aided by Hollander and Einwohner‘s typology of resistance. In 
order for resistance to manifest itself, there must be binary oppositions, and in 
my research, the struggle between the capitalists (manager) and labour 
(production operators) is not only a class issue but also has a gendered 
dimension. I argue that the capitalism, is a ‗disciplinary practice‘ where 
capitalists assert their repressive power in order to demand compliance from 
the labouring subject (Sakolsky, 1992). In the factories, the disciplinary 
practice is asserted via Taylorism, the scientific management of work, which 
includes the adherence towards standard operating protocol as well as Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) to monitor productivity. These are employed in 
order to obtain the maximum surplus-value from the employment of labour. As 
an extension of obtaining maximum surplus value from the labourer, the 
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production operators are paid only the minimum wage of 1,080,000rp 
(US$106.40). Further, when the work order increases, the factory increases 
its output by imposing compulsory overtime hours on its staff, since their 
production operators are single women who do not have a family to return to 
and hence usually available to perform overtime. Therefore, subjected the 
capitalist discipline, dissatisfaction amongst the female factory workers arise. 
 
From my interviews with the factory managers and factory workers, 
they highlight that there are four different forms of female labour resistance 
that may be enacted in succession: (1) production slowdown, (2) refusal to 
perform overtime hours, (3) mass absenteeism and lastly (4) labour strike. 
This chapter illustrates how resistance is translated into practice which argues 
for the significant agency of the female factory worker by highlighting the 
inherent contradiction in the logic of the resistance posed by these women. I 
shall show with evidence from other researchers as well as my own findings 
from my research site that employers are keen to employ women as 
production operators because they are believed to be the ideal workforce; 
docile and disciplined. How then do factory managers account for these 
displays of overt resistance by the women? What is not discussed in this 
section is how the workers themselves conceptualise their acts of resistance, 
since firstly, interviews with the managers were intended to uncover the role 
of managerial practice in the construction of a gendered workplace, and 




Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and ponders on the future directions of 
research with regard to issues concerning female factory workers in Batam. 
One of the interesting issues is the rise of labour organizations such as the 
FSPMI (Indonesian Metal Workers‘ Union) and Lomenik SPSI (Federation of 
Metal, Machine and Electronics) in representing the rights of the workers. 
Directions for future research may involve to noting the development of labour 
movements in Batam in their campaign against precarious work. What seems 
to be happening on the ground as a concomitant effect of the feminization of 
the workforce is the feminization of unions. Questions include, what does the 
feminization of unions mean and what are its projected future consequences? 
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Chapter 2:  Industrialization in Indonesia 
 
Framing the Global Factory: Indonesia‘s trajectory towards industrialization 
and the feminization of labour 
 
Women‘s labour force participation has increased dramatically in developing 
countries like Indonesia over the past several decades. While the proportion 
of employed women is still lower than in more developed countries, recent 
estimates indicated that labour force participation rates among women ages 
20 to 54 exceed 60 percent in developing countries as a whole. According to 
information from the International Labour Organization (ILO), women‘s 
employment has increased faster than men‘s employment since 1980 in most 
regions of the world (Appleyard, 1999). Villareal and Yu (2007) argue that 
factors such as women‘s higher educational attainment and lower fertility rate, 
as well as changing attitudes toward women working outside the home, raise 
female employment rates by increasing the demand for female workers in the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
This increase is female labour force participation is especially 
pronounced in developing countries which embrace export oriented 
industrialization with a focus on the manufacturing industry, such as the four 
Asian tigers, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea and other 
developing countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Kaur 
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(2004) attributes the shift of manufacturing labour-intensive consumer goods 
from the developed to the developing countries to a global restructuring for 
manufacturing. Increased global competition resulted in the industry in the 
United States, Europe and Japan ‗reassembling‘ itself to reduce costs while 
remaining competitive.1 
 
Therefore, in order to understand globalization and women‘s 
employment in developing countries like Indonesia, it is important to attune 
ourselves to the historical emergence of the export oriented industrialization 
strategy and how this has affected labour patterns. The political context of its 
emergence is also important as this elucidates the relationship between the 
state, labour and civil society. 
 
Becoming an exporter of manufactures: the case of Indonesia 
 
Indonesia was described in the 1960s as being one of the least industrialized 
countries in the world for its size (Hill, 1990) and the manufacturing sector 
only totalled an estimate of 840,000 workers in 1971. During the 1980s, 
however, due to trade liberalization and deregulation policies, Indonesia 
moved from being a negligible exporter of manufactures to a significant 
supplier. Statistics show that in 1980, manufactures generated less than 3 
percent of total exports; however by 1992 they were nearly 50 percent (Hill, 
1996:810). This expansion was facilitated by a series of trade reforms as 
                                                 
1
 For a more detailed discussion, refer to Gills & Piper (2002), Kaur (2004) and Caraway (2007). 
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Indonesia – a major oil exporter – coped with the collapse of the price of oil. 
This present section highlights Indonesia‘s rise as an export manufacturer and 
the concomitant effects on the changes in labour structure i.e. – the 
feminization of labour and its resultant effects, such as the patterns of 
migration and concerns on exploitative nature of female factory work. 
 
The 1980s trade reforms have already been very well documented by 
other writers but it is imperative that a brief introduction is given to provide a 
background understanding, highlighting industrial change in Indonesia. 
 
Successful economic policy in Indonesia is always traced back to the 
years of 1966 to 1997/8.  During New Order rule, under the presidency of 
Suharto, the Indonesian economy experienced rapid and sustained growth, 
which enabled Indonesia to rise up the ranks from one of the poorest 
countries in the mid-1960s to one of the eight high-performing Asian 
economies in the early 1990s, along with Japan and the four Asian Tigers-- 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea - as well as Indonesia‘s 
neighbours Malaysia and Thailand. 
 
The rapid economic growth during the period 1965 to 1997 was driven 
mostly by the expansion of three main sectors of the economy—agriculture, 
manufacturing and services. However, it was the manufacturing sector 
throughout this period which was growing at double digits, much faster than 
the other two sectors which were growing at single digits. The average growth 
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rate during this period, as highlighted in table 2.1 below averaged at about 7.0 
percent. 
 
Table 2.1: Economic Growth and Transformation in Indonesia, 1965-97 
 
Source: Thee, 2006:343 
 
In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Indonesia‘s rapid industrial 
growth was fuelled by the liberalization of economic policies which also 
marked its return to normal economic conditions after the political turmoil and 
economic chaos of the early 1960s, a remnant of the Sukarno years. 
 
Up to the late 1970s, the growth of the Indonesian economy was based 
primarily on its exports of crude oil. It was during this oil boom period that the 
Indonesian economy was able to sustain protectionist import-substituting 
policies. The de facto Indonesian Minister of Industry, B. J. Habibie, rejected 
free market solutions and opted for industrialization via import substitution 
(ISI). ISI is based on production for the local market and involves high levels 
of protection for domestic producers. As was the case with other South-East 
Asian countries, ISI did not achieve the results expected, partly due to the fact 
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that Southeast Asian countries did not have sufficiently large domestic 
markets to sustain the industries (Kaur, 2004). This raised a concern amongst 
many Indonesian and foreign economic analysts about this costly and 
inefficient pattern of import substituting industrialization. Indonesia‘s strategy 
of import substitution industrialization (ISI) in the years from 1968 to the 1980s 
yielded dismal numbers with regard to employment, with the number of 
workers increasing by only 130,000 between 1971 and 1980 (Caraway, 
2007), but the large boom from the oil revenues enabled the Indonesian 
government to ignore its critics. However, the decline in crude oil prices in the 
early 1980s, which signalled the end of the oil boom, prompted the 
government to diversify its exports by promoting manufactured exports via 
introducing a series of deregulation measures to boost foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The result of this is shown in table 2.2, from which it can be 
seen that between 1983 and 1991, both the agricultural and mining sectors 
declined in importance, while the share of manufacturing in GDP grew, from 
12.8 percent to 20.2 percent in 1991. Indonesia‘s shift from the agricultural 
sector to the manufacturing sector is evident in the figures for 1991. A 
precedent was set when manufacturing‘s contribution to GDP exceeded the 
contribution of the agricultural sector (Aswicahyono, 1997: 25). 
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Table 2.2: The Indonesian Economy (%GDP) 
 
Year 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 
Agriculture 22.8 22.6 21.3 20.5 18.5 
Mining 20.8 18.2 17.3 15.5 15.7 
Manufacturing 12.8 15.9 17.2 18.7 20.2 
Construction 5.9 5.3 5.1 5.4 6.1 
Services 37.7 38.0 39.1 39.9 39.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Tan (2001: 245). 
 
At the same time, the share of manufactured exports in total exports rose to 
51.7% while that of crude oil and natural gas fell to 37.4 percent. Table 2.3 
shows the composition of Indonesia‘s manufactured exports in 1991. 
 
Table 2.3: Indonesia‘s Manufactured Exports, 1991 
 
Item % Total 






Resource Intensive 29.5 
Plywood 25.7 
Capital Intensive 12.8 
Fertilizer 2.5 
Paper Products 2.2 
Steel Products 2.1 
Source: Tan (2001: 246). 
 
Since 1987, the manufacturing sector generated a surge in manufactured 
exports, particularly low skill labour-intensive exports, where Indonesia clearly 
had a comparative advantage. Indonesia‘s manufacturing sector thrived 
because it was able to leverage on its large labour surplus.  
 
 20 
The policy measures adopted in 1986, especially the devaluation and 
the trade liberalization measures, put Indonesia on the path to rapid export-
oriented, labour-intensive growth on a similar trajectory to that which its 
neighbours like Singapore had adopted earlier. This pattern of growth, 
characterized as the "East Asian model", had been adopted at least two 
decades earlier by the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) like Argentina, 
Brazil, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and at least a decade earlier by Indonesia's 
ASEAN neighbours, such as Singapore and Malaysia. 
 
In order to leverage on its comparative advantage in export 
manufacturing, as part of its strategy to attract an inflow of large foreign direct 
investment (FDI), Indonesia established export processing zones (also called 
‗bonded zones‘ by commentators on the Indonesian economy).  Export 
processing zones (EPZs) became an important feature of the industrial 
landscape of several Asian and Latin American countries. These zones 
consist of limited areas of land lying in a sense outside the normal customs 
jurisdictions. Imported goods may be brought into the zones duty-free for 
processing provided that all output is sold abroad. In practice, not all EPZs 
conform exactly to this definition, but the emphasis on exporting distinguishes 
the zones from other types of industrial estates (Grundy-Warr, 1983:28). 
 
The investing firms view the zones as a means of reducing costs by 
transferring the labour intensive parts of their production processes to low 
wage countries. Governments in the host countries in turn have leveraged on 
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the EPZ strategy as a means of generating employment opportunities, foreign 
exchange earnings and technology transfer. Substantial incentives have been 
offered to attract foreign firms into the zones. In various countries these have 
included different combinations of duty-free import of manufactured 
intermediate goods and raw materials, company tax holidays, subsidized 
provision of factory space and/or utilities, streamlined bureaucratic and 
administrative procedures to avoid costly red tape, exemptions from industrial 
regulations applying outside the zones, guarantees on the absence of strikes 
and guaranteed repatriation of profits (Thee, 2006). 
 
In 1973, an export processing zone was established in Jakarta under 
the control of a state company P.T. (Persero) – Bonded Warehouses 
Indonesia (BWI). Warr emphasized that during the time of his writing, in 1983; 
it was the only EPZ existing in Indonesia and was established as a pilot 
project under the Ministry of Trade with a view to assessing whether similar 
zones should be established elsewhere in Indonesia. 
 
Peripheral Hub of Indonesian Capitalism: The Batam Development Program 
(1970-present) 
 
In the early 1970s, Batam was still a largely uninhabited island of fishing 
communities with an estimated population of 6000, located in the Riau 
archipelago (Kelly, 2003). With an intention to developing the island of Batam 
for economic purposes, the Indonesia government in 1972 set up a 
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partnership with Pertamina, the state oil company, along with NisshoIwai Co. 
Ltd of Japan and Pacific Bechtel of U.S.A (BIDA, 1980). Pertamina was 
initially interested to develop Batam as an oil and gas exploration base with 
downstream processing activities on the island.  Following a draft of Batam‘s 
Master Plan, industrial areas were designated in Batam in 1973 and in the 
following year a customs-free bonded zone was officially created on the island 
along with the establishment of the Batam Industrial Development Authority 
(BIDA) in order to encourage export-oriented industries. 
 
The creation of the bonded zone 2  was intended to stimulate the 
development of export-oriented industries and facilitate the importation of 
materials required by the manufacturing industries located on the island. One 
of the most important of the concessions granted was the duty-free import of 
all raw materials and component inputs on the condition that all of it is to be 
used or processed within the island or is destined for re-export (KPMG, 
1993:12-13). The Indonesian government aimed to make the development of 
Batam a link between the Indonesian domestic economy and the world 
economy. Currently, Batam‘s main industries are electronics, manufacturing 
and ship-building. 
 
                                                 
2
 Bonded zones are also referred to as Export Processing Zones (EPZs) by commentators. 
Grundy-Warr‘s (1989) article on ‗Export Processing Zones: The Economics of Enclave 
Manufacturing‘ succintly describes the nature of EPZs and their characteristics, such as the 
provision of tax holidays and duty-free imports of raw materials, streamlined administration 
and having a fenced-in infrastructure which prevents the smuggling of duty-free raw materials 
into the domestic market. 
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In order to boost foreign direct investment into Batam, a number of 
attractive incentives and guarantees were put in place to attract investors. 
These main incentives as a bonded zone are highlighted in figure 2.1: 
 
Figure 2.1: Main incentives for Batam‘s Bonded Zone 
 
Taxes 
 Tax free holiday of up to six years for priority projects 
calculated from the time the enterprise begins 
production 
 Accelerated depreciation of fixed assets 
Exemption from Import Duties 
 All fixed assets such as machinery and equipment 
needed for the operation of the enterprise are exempt 
from Indonesian import duties. 
Freedom to Manage 
 The investor is given full authority to determine his own 
management operation and may employ foreign 
management and technical workers in positions for 
which qualified Indonesians are not yet available. 
Source: BIDA, 1980 
 
As highlighted in the previous section, Indonesia‘s deregulation and 
trade liberalization policy during the post-oil crisis of the 1980s led to the focus 
towards a new industrialization strategy which was to manufacture for export—
export oriented industrialization (EOI). This strategy was first adopted by 
Singapore in the mid-1960s during a time when Singapore was separated 
from the Malaysian Federation, which therefore meant that adopting the ISI 
strategy was a less feasible option as their internal market was significantly 
reduced. EOI proved to be a successful strategy3 and helped Singapore gain 
its status in the 1970s as a first tier newly industrialized country (NIC). 
                                                 
3
 Consequently, Singapore‘s GDP grew, in real terms, at an average annual rate of 13.6 per 
cent between 1966 and 1969, and at 8.3 per cent between 1970 and 1979 (Kaur, 2004). 
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Singapore‘s successful early adoption of export oriented industrialization 
(EOI) served as a model for other countries like Indonesia, similarly seeking to 
grow and industrialize (Kaur, 2004). This prompted Indonesia to begin talks 
on cooperation with its neighbour Singapore from the early 1980s; however 
such talks only bore fruit in the late 1980s when Indonesia was willing to grant 
regulatory concessions to Singapore which relaxed restrictions with respect to 
foreign investment and ownership. 
 
This cooperation could not have come at a more fortuitous time for 
Singapore as the state‘s rapid growth in the manufacturing sector raised 
alarm for Singapore‘s economic planners, given that it faced severe limits in 
its labour and land resources. There was a fear that Singapore‘s inability to 
provide for foreign investors in these respects would cause a ‗hollowing out‘ of 
the economy as industry moved to other parts of Asia. During that period of 
time, Singapore was faced with the problem of the rising cost of labour and 
the subsequent movement of multi-national companies moving out of the 
country into more cost-efficient manufacturing sites in other parts of Asia 
(Ford & Lyons, 2007:242). A ‗regionalisation strategy‘ due to its proximity to 
the Riau islands would be beneficial to Singapore, combining Singapore‘s port 
and service industries with Batam‘s ready pool of cheap labour. Singapore 
linked Batam, Indonesia and Johor, Malaysia in a growth triangle project to 
assuage any concerns from Malaysia over Singapore‘s assistance to a new 
competitor location for foreign investment. The SIJORI (Singapore-Johor-
Riau) Growth Triangle was first publicly announced in 1989 by Singapore 
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Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. As more states from Malaysia and 
Indonesia joined the grouping, SIJORI was renamed Indonesia-Malaysia-
Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT). A 1994 Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) formalized the tripartite IMS framework. It also became apparent that 
the Indonesia-Singapore link was without doubt the most active (Royle, 1997; 
Grundy-Warr et al, 1999; Mack, 2004). 
 
The participation that resulted has turned around Batam‘s investment 
prospects, especially following the development of Batam Industrial Park with 
the promise of attracting Singapore-based TNCs to Batam. The largest of 
these industrial estates is the Indonesia-Singapore joint venture between the 
Salim Group of Indonesia and the government-linked Singapore Technologies 
(now known as SembCorp) and Jurong Town Corporation. This industrial 
estate, BatamIndo Industrial Park is located in the Muka Kuning area, in the 
heart of the island, and is still the largest and most developed industrial estate 
on the island. BatamIndo Industrial Park has significant investments from 
countries such as the USA and those of Western Europe (for instance the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands), as well as Asian 
countries like Japan, Malaysia and Singapore. Sumitomo was the first tenant, 
established in 1990, and other tenants later included AT&T, Philips, Thomson, 
Sony and Epson. The environment of the BatamIndo Industrial Park will be 
further elaborated on and discussed in Chapter 4, since this study is 
specifically focused on female factory workers working within the compounds 
of this Park. The park‘s niche is assembly operations, and it employs young 
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female labour as the majority of its workforce. In early 1997, out of a total 
employment of around 55,000, 85% of its workers were females aged 18-22. 
 

































Source: BIDA, 2009. 
 
Though the IMS-GT was marred by numerous setbacks which culminated in 
the Asian financial crisis, the economy seemed to recover (as indicated above 
in figure 2.2).  It grew from 3.08 per cent per year in 1998 to 6.38 per cent in 
1999 and peaked in 2001 at 7.9 per cent growth. However, year on year 
growth fell in 2003 at 7.28 per cent and has since levelled out between 7.46 
per cent to 7.51 per cent from 2004 to 2007. However, it is said that the 
manufacturing sector has not recovered to pre- 1997 levels and the growth 
triangle is coming to be regarded on all sides as a failure (Sparke et al, 2004, 
Ford & Lyons, 2007). Others such as Pereira (2004) provide a more balanced 
viewpoint in that as an entrepreneurial venture, the park has its fair share of 
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successes and failures. The most positive aspect of the project via the 
viewpoint of its investors was its effectiveness as a cheap and efficient 
industrial production site. It also generated jobs for the Indonesian workforce, 
as an estate, BatamIndo employs about 60,000 to 80,000 workers.   
 
Human Migration to Batam  
 
According to Ford & Lyons (2007), historically, early migration to Batam 
began in 1945 when a number of young people moved there in order to 
support the Indonesian army after the declaration of Independence, but the 
population on the island remained small in the 1970s. Once development 
began, as a consequence of attracting high levels of foreign investment, 
Batam also began to attract large volumes of migrants within Indonesia 
seeking work in its industrial parks and tourist resorts (Grundy-Warr et al, 
1999; Ford & Lyons, 2007). Due to plans to develop the island industrially 
under the Batam Master plan, by 1978, when Batam was designated as a tax-
free bonded zone for export industries, its population had increased to 31,800 
(Ford & Lyons, 2007:241). Over the next ten years, domestic and foreign 
investors were attracted to Batam and large numbers of construction workers 
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Batam witnessed phenomenal changes in twenty years, between 1970 
and 1990, partly due to the formation of the IMS-GT, with the official 
population growing from 31,800 in 1978 to 105,820 by December 1990. 
Batam‘s population growth continued to grow sharply in the boom years. In 
1990, as shown in Fig 2.3 above, Batam registered a population of 105,820, 
with almost a seven-fold increase by 2007, to 724,315. Kelly (2003) noted that 
there is even reason to believe that the number is a gross underestimation, 
considering the unrecorded numbers of migrants arriving daily on the island 
from different parts of the Indonesian archipelago. Senior BIDA officials 
estimate that figure to be in the range of 500,000 per year, with 1000-2000 
migrants disembarking every week. 
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However, though Batam experienced high population growth, its 
workforce only made up about 32 per cent of the total population, suggesting 
that there is a high unemployment rate on the island. In 2007, the rising 
unemployment rate in Batam and the Riau islands was reported in the Jakarta 
Post, which cited the departure of several major foreign companies from the 
area. According to data cited, unemployment on Batam in 2007 reached 
180,000, a 20 per cent increase from the year before (Jakarta Post, October 6 
2007). However, the high unemployment rate is not discouraging more job-
seekers, mainly new high-school graduates, who flock to the island for job 
opportunities (Jakarta Post, July 1 2008). The government voiced fears that 
the soaring unemployment rate could undermine security and public order, as 
well as cause a strain on Batam‘s limited resources, which can accommodate 
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one million people at most. Its current population had already reached more 
than 790,000 in 2008.  
 
The workforce statistics also show that there is an imbalance towards 
women, who represent 56% of the total workforce (Kelly, 2003). The greater 
number of women provides some indication of the gendered division of labour 
that exists in the industrial estates.  
  
Clearly, given Batam‘s original low population, the workers were mostly 
migrant workers from different parts of the Indonesian archipelago. This influx 
is in line with the government‘s policy of curbing population growth and 
encouraging population redistribution.  Since they face massive 
overpopulation in areas such as Java, they have for long encouraged 
transmigration (BIDA, 1980). Most of the workforce is accounted for in 
manufacturing (75 percent), construction (10 percent) and the leisure industry 
(7 percent).  
 
The IMS-GT cooperation was however marred by setbacks and was 
especially affected by the economic and political uncertainty in the aftermath 
of the Asian financial crisis (1997-98). Many multinational investors began 
downsizing operations and investments in Batam, but Lyons and Ford point 
out that the crisis had the opposite effect on internal migration. The island‘s 
‗relative prosperity became a magnet for people in other parts of the 
Indonesian archipelago‘ (Ford & Lyons, 2007:242). In the three years after the 
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crisis (1998-2001), Batam‘s population grew by an incredible 79.5 per cent 
and by the end of 2004, the population of Batam was 633,944 (Ford & Lyons, 
2007:242). They argued that migrants from other parts of Indonesia were 
attracted to the island by the ‗prospects of employment in an economy that 
had been cushioned from the economic crisis of 1997-98, or because of their 
relative calm during the violence that erupted across the archipelago from 
1998‘ (Ford & Lyons, 2007: 242). 
 
However, Batam suffered an economic slowdown especially between 
the years 2000 - 2004 when non-oil exports declined by US$1.11 billion, 
shrinking by 20 per cent. Foreign investment in 2005 also fell by 34 per cent 
(The Straits Times, 15 September 2006).In recent years however, investor 
confidence in Batam has further dwindled due to the lack of concessions and 
Indonesia‘s eroding comparative advantage in labour costs over emerging 
industrializing countries such as China and Vietnam. This is also further 
exacerbated by the current economic recession. In order to regain investor 
confidence, current President Yudhoyono launched the much delayed free 
trade zone for Batam in 2009 (Jakarta Post, January 20 2009). The 
government is hoping that with Batam‘s status as a free-trade zone and the 
exemption of value-added tax (VAT), import duties and luxury tax, this will 
spur more foreign businesses to invest on the island and tap its low 
production costs. However, to date Batam has never really recovered from the 
1997-98 financial crisis and this free-trade zone status may be a last ditch 
effort, which proves too little, too late, to try and invigorate the island‘s 
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economy as the global crisis hits hard on the local manufacturing industry in 
Batam (Jakarta Post, 20 June 2009). The government however still remains 
optimistic, citing that despite the economic crisis, new industries are still being 
set up in the Riau islands and are in desperate need of 100,000 skilled 
workers (The Jakarta Post, 2 July 2009). In the first four months of 2009, the 
government announced that they have approved 29 foreign investment 
projects worth US$23.2 million (Asia Pulse, 4 June 2009). 
 
Effects of Industrialization: Batam as a transient migrant space 
 
Kelly (2003) highlights Batam‘s unique administrative structure as a distinctive 
characteristic about the island‘s industrialization process. Batam‘s 
administrative structure has BIDA rather than the local municipal or provincial 
governments in control of all developmental planning on the island. The 
chairman of BIDA reports directly to the President and bypasses all levels of 
intermediate authority. The resultant effect is the focus on economic 
development on the island. The needs of investors are privileged, with social 
concerns being accorded secondary importance. This is in order to promote 
investor confidence by showing Indonesia‘s strong commitment towards the 
development of Batam as an EOI. 
 
Rapid development on Batam, under the administration of BIDA, has 
changed its social and physical landscape drastically. Forests were razed to 
make way for new commercial centres, residential estates, tourist resorts and 
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industrial areas. While most migrants brought in on temporary contracts to 
work in BatamIndo are offered accommodation in dormitories, many more live 
in squatter settlements on land that has been cleared of forests but remain 
undeveloped. Due to the transient nature of their work, most migrants see 
themselves as sojourners with no sense of long-term commitment to the 
place. Their intent would not usually extend to building a more liveable 
physical and social environment which is in line with the government‘s 
ambivalence towards improving the social space in Batam, especially in terms 
of proper housing. 
 
However, the administrative structure of Batam has recently changed 
since the city of Batam has changed to a township status of a municipality 
(Batam Center, 2009). Currently, Batam‘s Mayor is responsible for the civic 
administration as well as social affairs, and works hand in hand with BIDA 
whose responsibility is to promote economic development by managing the 
land and infrastructure as well as stimulating investment in the Barelang 
(Batam, Rempang, Galang) region. Even so, the government has reiterated 
the view that Batam is just a transit city and that the high volume of 
Indonesians who arrive in Batam are in transit to other countries such as 
Malaysia and Singapore (Antara, 26 October 2007).  
 
In fact, the government has no plans to accommodate the settling of 
migrants in Batam as it seeks to control the city‘s burgeoning population 
growth. It is reported that Batam is ‗at risk‘ of experiencing a baby boom within 
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the next five years due to rapid migration from other provinces. The 
government reiterated that Batam has very limited resources such as clean 
water and land and could only accommodate up to one million people; 
anything above that limit could spark social problems. Their response to 
addressing the problem is to promote family planning programmes as well as 
tightening the conditions for the issuance of identity cards in order to curb the 
population growth. 
 
Further evidence which suggests the government‘s ambivalence 
towards social issues in Batam is shown in its slow reaction in tackling health 
issues such as recognizing Batam‘s dengue troubles in 2009. 4  The 
government‘s reluctance to declare an alert for the spread of the virus was 
because ‗such announcements would have an impact on a number of sectors 
including tourism and business‘, which again shows the privileged importance 
of the economic activities on the island, over-riding the social concerns of the 
resident population.5 
 
Grundy-Warr et al. (1999) further point out that the uncontrolled inflow 
of migrants from other parts of Indonesia poses an increasing threat to the 
economy of Batam. Since there is little investment in low-income housing, 
coupled with uncertain employment, squatter housing has proliferated. Illegal 
                                                 
4
 During the first six months of 2009, nearly 800 people reportedly contracted dengue fever in 
Batam, with 10 deaths. Population density as well as a lack of adequate sanitation and the 
presence of stagnant water in many areas has been blamed for the spread of dengue 
(Jakarta Post, 16 July 2009). 
5
 Issues of Batam being a transient space has been discussed in depth by writers such as Ford & Lyons 
(2007) which can be referred to for further understanding as it lies outside of the scope of this research. 
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squatter housing colloquially known as ruli‘, short for rumah liar or ‗wild 
housing‘ is scattered across the island. These squatter areas are seen as a 
threat to Batam‘s investment attractiveness to multinational companies. 
 
Concomitantly, Grundy-Warr et al. view the lack of sufficient housing 
and employment for migrants as leading to other social problems such as 
crime and prostitution. In fact, the sex industry has become a major activity in 
Batam, with demand from visitors on short-stay trips, mostly from Singapore. 
Due to this ‗Batam scene‘, HIV infections have also increased. Batam ranks 
as a hot spot for infections, contributing to the fact that Riau shows one of the 
highest provincial rates of HIV/AIDS infection spread through sexual contacts 
(28 June 2008, Jakarta Post).  
 
Though these issues are beyond the scope of this thesis, this account  
sheds light on some of the effects of industrialization in Batam as a result of 
focused development on the economy, coupled with the lack of social 
development, i.e. provision of housing or proper heath policy for the migrant 
community. 
 
The Gendered Effects of Industrialization – Waves of Feminization in 
Indonesia 
 
One of the main issues that will be discussed in this thesis is the gendered 
effects of industrialization. It is therefore important to understand the 
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emergence of the feminization of labour in Indonesia and understand the 
political and socio-economic climate of its emergence. As highlighted in the 
earlier sections, in the 1980‘s Indonesia‘s economy experienced rapid change 
as it strove to modernize its economy, moving away from its traditional role as 
an agrarian society.  
 
Ford & Lyons (2007) noted that the gender composition of Batam‘s 
population has changed considerably after the formation of the IMS-GT. Since 
the late 1990s when the factories and infrastructure were complete, large 
numbers of female factory workers replaced the construction workers and 
male factory workers. This was due to the stereotype that female factory 
workers were best suited to work in the electronic industries, a contention that 
will be discussed fully in Chapter 4. Since 1997 women have outnumbered 
men on Batam, which reflects the increased pressure on women in other parts 
of Indonesia to migrate for work as a result of the Asian financial crisis of 
1997-98 (Ford & Lyons, 2007). Therefore, it could be argued that on Batam, 
the feminization of labour began in the 1990s when investment in the 
manufacturing sector began, since prior to Batam‘s development plans, the 
area was largely uninhabited. However, before then, the cogs were already in 
motion for the feminization of labour in other parts of Indonesia, such as in the 
export processing zones in Jakarta (Grundy-Warr, 1983).  
 
Caraway‘s (2007) review of the feminist literature on women‘s work in 
export processing zones showed that the authors pinned the causes of 
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feminization of labour to the strategy of manufacturing for export and labour 
intensity. According to these authors (Elson & Pearson, 1981; Joekes, 1987; 
Lim, 1983) ‗export and labour intensity compel factories to reduce labour 
costs as much as possible in order to compete‘ (Caraway, 2007:16). 
Therefore, it is their contention that the feminization of labour is facilitated by 
the emergence of the EOI strategy. Caraway however refutes that statement 
and argue that in Indonesia, the feminization of labour preceded years before 
the EOI strategy was in place. 
 
‗Feminization unfolded in a series of waves. Textiles, in particular 
spinning and weaving, pioneered the first wave of feminization 
during the ISI years. Plywood and garments led the second wave, 
which coincided with the transition phase of industrialization. 
Footwear and electronics, along with the sectors from the second 
wave, propelled the third wave. Foreign investment did not play a 
significant role in the first two waves of feminization—which is 
surprising, given the overwhelming emphasis on the role of 
multinational corporations in the feminization literature—but they 
were a key component of the third wave.‘ 
(Caraway, 2007: 87) 
 
Therefore, Caraway argues that contrary to what previous authors have 
written, the feminization of labour in Indonesia may not necessarily been 
driven by the EOI strategy, but was facilitated initially by its ISI strategy. By 
the 1980s, the facilitating pieces were all in place and all that was needed to 
generate an impressive wave of feminization was a substantial increase in 
demand for women workers. Expanding on the above, Caraway highlights 
that the feminization process in Indonesia can be separated into three waves 
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in tandem with its three stages of industrialization: the ISI period (1968-78), 
the transition period (1979-86), and EOI (1987-1997).6 
 
In the first wave under its ISI strategy, employers in garments and 
textiles responded to the changes in women‘s fertility and education by 
shifting selected jobs to women. However since employment in the labour 
intensive sectors had not expanded significantly, the degree of this early 
feminization was modest. 
 
The second wave of feminization began in the transition years between 
ISI and full-blown export promotion, in the years 1979 to 1986 before the oil-
crisis hit. This was facilitated by the demobilization of unions and political 
parties as well as repression of labour by the New Order state. As Indonesia 
was also moving away from agriculture, coupled with the economic crisis, this 
created a larger pool of women workers available for mobilization into the 
factories. The first major exporting industries during this period were mainly 
concentrated on the processing of plywood and production of garments. 
 
The third wave proved to be the most significant, driven by foreign 
investors from East Asia who turned to South East Asian countries like 
Indonesia due to rising production costs. This was mainly led by the 
electronics and footwear sector, and there was significant interest in EPZs like 
Batam which further increased the demand for female labour. Both at home 
                                                 
6
 A detailed discussion of the three waves of feminization can be found in Caraway’s (2007) book, 
‘Assembling Women: The Feminization of Global Manufacturing’, pp.88-97. 
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and abroad, Asian investors preferred to hire women in electronics, especially 




This chapter illustrates Indonesia‘s trajectory towards industrialization via 
trade reforms in the 1960s and especially with trade liberalization policies in 
the 1980s when the government moved away from their import substitution 
policies in support of a more export oriented industry in the post-oil crisis of 
the 1980s, taking cue from the success of newly industrializing countries 
(NICs) such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia. Bonded zones 
or Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were created in Indonesia. This highlights 
the creation of an EPZ in Batam as the government aimed to develop the 
island as a link between the Indonesian domestic economy and the world 
economy by stimulating the development of export-oriented industries. 
Economic cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore created 
the formation of industrial parks in Batam, with the most significant project 
being BatamIndo Industrial Park, co-owned by Singapore and Indonesia, 
whose factories largely specialize in assembly operations, which mostly 
required and hired female labour. Since Batam was still a largely uninhabited 
island of 6000 people, most of the workforce is made up of migrant workers 
from different parts of the Indonesian archipelago. However, in recent years, 
with foreign investors downscaling or closing their operations in Batam due to 
the economic downturn, this has resulted in a high unemployment rate. 
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Therefore, as a borderland region, Batam has experienced rapid social 
and economic transformation by virtue of its proximity to wealthier economies 
such as Singapore. The growth of manufacturing industries in Batam has 
created a demand for labour and improved infrastructure which facilitated the 
movement of people into the islands. However, recently fraught by several 
economic crises, the island is experiencing a hollowing out of the economy 
with companies downsizing or moving out, cutting down the number of jobs 
available in Batam. To further exacerbate the situation, more internal migrants 
are still flocking to Batam with the prospect of finding employment, leading to 
the high unemployment rate of 180,000 in 2007. 
 
One of the concomitant effects of Batam‘s industrialization is the feminization 
of its workforce. A profile of female factory workers in Batam and the 
environment and social landscape of Batamindo Industrial Park in Batam is 
further discussed in Chapter 3. 
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One of the most effects of industrialization, as a result of export oriented 
industrialization in Indonesia is the rise of a new class of women workers. 
Improved education levels has resulted in the emergence of women workers 
who are economically independent and active within the workforce. Statistics 
from 2007 show that 68 per cent of females are in secondary school and 17 
per cent of those at tertiary age are receiving tertiary education (Unesco, 
2007). Education has equipped women with the skills and knowledge to 
remain economically viable as Indonesia experienced a shift from an agrarian 
mode of production to industrialization, though this means for many, migrating 
from their villages to industrial cities such as Jakarta and Batam. In this 
chapter, I explore the lives of the female factory workers in Batam as they 
relate to me their experience of working and living in Batam as well as the 
relationships that they form during their sojourn on the island. 
 
Ford & Lyons (2007) point out that the gender composition of Batam‘s 
population changed considerably after the formation of the IMS-GT. Since the 
late 1990s when the factories and infrastructure were complete, large 
numbers of female factory workers replaced the construction workers and 
male factory workers. This was due to the stereotype that female factory 
workers were best suited to work in the electronic industries, a contention that 
will be discussed fully in Chapter 4 where I highlight the issues on gender and 
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work and the discursive formation of gender and labour. Ford & Lyons 
highlight that since 1997, women workers have outnumbered men on Batam 
which could reflect the increased pressure on women in other parts of 
Indonesia to migrate for work as a result of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
98. 
 
According to BIDA, there are a total of 26 industrial estates which are 
situated in Batam, in which most of the female workers are employed in as 
production operators in the manufacturing industry. These industrial estates 
are located mostly in areas such as Batu Ampar, Muka Kuning, Batam 
Centre, Sekupang and Kabil. 
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Figure 3.1: Location of BatamIndo Industrial Estate 
 
Source: Adapted from Royle, 1997:92. 
 
BatamIndo Industrial Complex 
 
BatamIndo Industrial Park, currently owned by SembCorp Singapore, was 
established in 1991 and is the largest industrial estate in Batam, occupying a 
sprawling 320 hectares across Muka Kuning district. It is a self-sustainable 
complex which boasts dormitories for workers, food centres, wet markets, 
shopping malls, recreational sports centre, clinic and places of worships that 
include two mosques and a church. A short distance away, in order to 
accommodate the professionals located in BatamIndo, the BatamIndo 
Executive Village run by SouthLinks Country Club has facilities that include a 
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golf course, driving range, tennis courts and swimming pool. The complex 
even has its own dedicated water treatment plant and power station. In fact, 
the complex is so self-sustainable that its residents would never have to leave 
the industrial park.  
 
BatamIndo hosts about 80 companies involved in several light 
industries relating to the production of electronic components and computer 
industries. These include manufacturers of printed circuit boards (PCBs), 
computer components and parts, audio and video equipment, and car 
automotive parts. Some of the internationally recognized electronic 
companies present are Epson, Ciba, Sanyo, Hyundai, Matsushita, Phillips, 
Siemens, Sony and McDermott, which represent a lot of foreign investment 
from countries such as the US, South Korea and Japan.   As a whole, the 
estate employs 60,000 to 80,000 workers. BatamIndo has been very well 
described by scholars like Mack (2004) and Peter (2008). 
 
‗Behind the storefronts narrow foot paths lead to tin and wooden 
shanties which house the poorest workers. The massive 
industrial complex is protected by heavy iron bars with razor 
wire running along the top. To enter and leave you must pass a 
guarded security check point and provide identification. Inside 
the billion dollar complex, corporate buildings of the world‘s 
biggest brand names, complete with polished chrome lettering 
and tinted glass, loom large amidst the well-paved streets and 
manicured lawns. Many workers never leave the industrial park. 
They live in company housing, go to the company shops, visit 
the company clinic and pray at the company mosque. It is a 
caged existence.‘ 
 




Indeed BatamIndo industrial park is situated far from neighbouring cities. 
Once past the security, rows and rows of industrial buildings line up along the 
roads which intersect at 90 degrees, which goes to show the amount of 
planning which went into the development of the estate. Most of the buildings 
look similar, distinguished only by their chrome lettering, which distinctly mark 
the company‘s name and logo. In fact, it was built on plans which mirror 
Jurong industrial estate in Singapore where pre-built factory units of various 
sizes were built, ready to be leased to investors. Driving around the complex, 
it had a very strong American and Japanese presence with companies like 
Philips, NuTune, and PerkinElmer, as well as Shikoku Electronics, FujiTec, 
Sumitomo, Casio and Minamoto. I initially was fooled by the laid-back 
atmosphere, with only a few people milling about around the compounds, but 
when it came to shift change in the mornings and evenings, the area is a hive 
of activity with masses of workers leaving and entering the buildings, and the 
roads ruled by green TransKIB (Kompleks Industri BatamIndo) vans and ojeks 
(motorcycle taxis). 
 
Most of the workers are housed in dormitories (asrama) located at the 
back of the compound. 
 
―…the BatamIndo Industrial Park has been conceived as a self-
sufficient community of both factories and asrama (dormitory) 
residences. Residents are pre-selected, generally as part of the 
contract negotiated before arrival on Batam. Within the gates of 
the factory complex, the inhabitants are primarily women; the 
male dormitories that do exist are confined to special zones. It is 
a very insular neighbourhood… It is so self-contained, in fact, 
that it is unclear whether those who live and work in Batamindo 
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are encouraged to leave it at all. The estate is sited so far from 
the other cities in Batam that it exists as a kind of fortress with 
gated entrances.‖ 
 
(Mack, 2004: 171) 
 
 
Evidently, in my various interviews with the workers, most of the production 
operators prefer not to leave the compound as most of what they need can be 
obtained within the complex. Food centres are located around the estate as 
well as within their dormitory, but most of the workers would prefer to visit the 
wet markets to purchase their own food, and cook communally in their shared 
dormitory kitchen. Daily necessities can also be bought at small stalls located 
within their dormitory, or they can visit Plaza Batamindo which houses several 
cafes, a food court, a supermarket and also shops for gifts, clothing, books 
and such. Though it does seem to be a ‗caged existence‘ or a ‗fortress‘, the 
women I interviewed do leave the complex during their free time to places like 
Panbil Mall which is frequented by many factory workers, or Nagoya town, or 
they visit Barelang bridge or the beach for leisure. 
 
The factory managers, whom I interviewed, however, do not live on 
site, but in housing complexes such as Duta Mas, located about a ten-minute 
drive away in Batam Centre. They seldom hang around within the complex 
other than going to work or visiting the mosque to perform their prayers. 
Belonging to the middle-class, they prefer to visit malls such as Batam City 
Square (BCS) mall or Batam Centre or Vista Hill to admire the view, where 
more upper class residences are located. 
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A typical work day 
 
Ika, aged 25, has worked for PT Permata, a Japanese electronics 
manufacturing firm, for two years. She lives in a dormitory provided by the 
company within the complex of Batamindo. She shares the dormitory with 15 
other women. They sleep in bunk beds in a room and share common facilities 
like the kitchen, sitting room and four bathrooms. If she is on the morning 
shift, Ika gets up at half past six in the morning to get ready for work and puts 
on her uniform. As a conservative Muslim, Ika puts on a black cotton long-
sleeved shirt underneath her short sleeved uniform and wears the jilbab 
(headscarf). She hustles to put on her shoes to leave before her other 
dormitory mates, who would usually be on the same shift, because of an 
understood rule that the last to leave would have to lock up the dormitory. 
They would then walk together to the dormitory gate which would be a hive of 
activity with the different modes of transportation waiting to fetch the workers 
to work. She usually boards a green TransKIB (Transportasi Kompleks 
Industri BatamIndo) van which would take her directly to the factory gates of 
PT Permata, which costs 1000 rupiah (US$0.10). It is imperative for Ika and 
others like her not to be late, or else the van would leave without her, and she 
would have to take the ojek (motorcycle taxi) which would cost double the 
TransKIB fare. Ironically, Ika only takes the TransKIB van if it is full as it 
means that the van would leave sooner, compared to a near-empty van which 
would leave much later as it would have to wait for passengers to fill its seats. 
The transportation system within the BatamIndo complex is highly regulated. 
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Only TransKIB vans are allowed to ferry workers to work and ojeks, run by 
men, have to be registered and licensed with the BatamIndo administration 
and their drivers wear numbered, green helmets. The journey, however, 
doesn‘t take more than five minutes since the dormitory is located within the 
self-sufficient BatamIndo complex itself. 
 
Ika arrives outside the factory gates usually no later than half past 
seven and enters the factory premises ensuring that her staff pass, attached 
to her uniform pocket, is clearly shown. She enters the factory lobby and 
punches her timecard and goes to the canteen to meet her friends, some, like 
her, ready for their morning shift, while others are heading home after their 
night shift. Ika prefers to arrive early so as not to be tardy but mostly because 
she enjoys meeting up with her friends before she starts her shift.  
 
‗We often greet each other and smile and chit-chat and us being 
girls, exchange the latest gossip! I feel the most happiest at this 
time of the day during shift change because I feel so at ease in 
their company and this lifts my spirits and boosts my motivation 
to work.‘ 
 
(Ika, personal communication, 2009)  
 
Ika always wishes that they could chat longer but she has to get ready for 
work. Since she works in a clean room environment as she is involved in the 
production of FDB (Fluid Dynamic Bearings) motors required for hard disk 
drives, Ika has to go to the gowning room and put on the white jumpsuit and 
booties and a special metal bracelet that helps to de-staticize her body, before 
entering the highly controlled clean room environment. This robing and 
disrobing ritual is a little time-consuming but Ika explains that it is very 
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necessary as pollutants like dust and static may greatly affect the electronic 
products they are assembling. Ika jokes with her friends that robing makes her 
feel like a doctor entering an operating room which makes her feel rather 
‗professional‘. 
 
Ika likes her work environment as it is very clean and most importantly 
air-conditioned. She feels that her job also requires much technical expertise 
as she is working with machines, as compared to sweatshop textile or 
footwear factories near her hometown, back in Jakarta. She considers herself 
a skilled worker as precision and an eye for detail is required in order to 
produce the finished parts.  At half past eight, she is ready to start her 
workday at her station, which involves bearing assembly. She joins fifty other 
women workers in her assembly line which is headed by a lead girl who 
monitors their productivity. If Ika has any issues pertaining to work, such as 
taking leave, she consults her supervisor, who is usually male. Production 
operators are entitled to a day‘s leave for every month‘s service, which makes 
it twelve days in a year and also a day‘s menstrual leave each month. 
Approval for such matters would then need to go through higher 
management, the head supervisor and then the manager. The highest 
position in the factory is the production manager, who is usually an expatriate, 




The production operators only have one forty-five minute break for 
lunch at noon and Ika heads to the staff canteen, which is a welcome reprieve 
from work. She also manages to perform her afternoon prayer (sholat zuhur) 
before resuming work. The end of her normal shift is at half past five but 
sometimes, depending on the work order that they have to fulfill, the workers 
are asked to perform overtime and her shift may stretch till half past eight. At 
the end of her shift, she usually waits for her other friends to knock off from 
work and they leave work in a group and enjoy the walk home to their 
dormitory. They sometimes drop by nearby shops to purchase necessities as 
she admits that it is too far to shop outside the complex. Furthermore, the 
complex is very well-integrated with most amenities; hence they can purchase 
most of what they need at sundry shops located within their dormitories or at 
Plaza BatamIndo.  
 
Ika enjoys the camaraderie that exists between her and her friends as 
they perform most of their domestic home activities together, like cooking 
communally and retrieving their laundry. After dinner, they would usually 
watch some television while waiting for the call to evening prayer (sholat 
maghrib) and wind down with more television before going to bed. On some 
evenings, she will meet up with friends from IRMA (Ikatan Remaja Muslim 
Arema), which is a network of Muslim youths, and visit NurIs (Nurul Islam) 
mosque for some religious classes or Qur‘an recital (ngaji kitab).  
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Ika recounted to me how she and others like her found jobs here at 
BatamIndo. In 2007, Ika was recruited by a labour agency, Cipta Karya7, via 
recruitment drives organized by the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration 
(Departemen Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi Indonesia or TKI) where she 
had to go through several medical and psychological tests. She added that 
such jobs required single women to be between 17 and 22 years of age.  
 
Like most contract workers8, she was assigned to a two-year contract 
with PT Permata, and depending on her work performance, contracts may be 
extended on a yearly basis. By law, after three years of contracted work, 
workers should be hired permanently by the employer. The company paid her 
agency for her cost of travel to Batam as well as lodging costs at the 
dormitory. Coming from a family of four siblings, Ika comes from Yogyakarta 
and her family rely on the 500,000rp (US$50) she sends home each month. 
She makes the minimum wage of 1,080,000rp (US$106.40) per month but 
supplements it by working overtime hours, where wages are double their daily 
wages, so she makes an average monthly wage of about 1,500,000rp 
                                                 
7
 Other agencies include Cakra and Tunas Karya. 
8
 There are three types of employees hired in Batam‘s EPZ, namely the outsourced worker, 
contract worker and permanent worker. The most exploited worker is an outsourced worker. 
They are hired through a labour agency and usually sign a contract with the agency which 
holds them liable should they lose their job, sometimes at fees five to ten times their normal 
wage. These employees are traded like commodities, one step removed from human 
trafficking. Should they get ill, pregnant or hurt on the job, the company will immediately 
release them and the labour agency will likely fine the employee for the breach of contract. 
Contract workers however are generally hired by the principal company or recruited by an 
intermediary but contracted with the company directly. Contracts range from three months to 
two years. By law, after three years of contracted work, workers should be hired permanently 
by the employer. Permanent workers make up a very small minority of workers and this 
‗privilege‘ is usually reserved for staff positions at management level. These workers tend to 
make more money through annual raises and have better pay packages which include 
benefits (Peter, 2008). 
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(US$150). Ika says that though working overtime is tiring, she likes to perform 
overtime hours as that means she has more disposable income and also 
more to save for herself, considering that half her wages is sent home. She is 
considering remitting more as her youngest brother has the opportunity to 
enter a technical college but her family back home lack the finances to send 
him to school. The company works two shifts: 8am to 5.30pm and 8:30pm to 
5am. Workers are paid an extra 4,000rp (US$0.40) if they work the night shift 
and shifts are assigned on a weekly basis. The operators have to work a 
minimum of 153 hours a month and may need to perform overtime hours 
depending on the work order given by the company, and workers are paid 1.5 
to 4 times the daily wage rate for overtime hours. However, Ika mentions that 
recently, not much overtime is offered as their factory, like many other 
factories, is experiencing a slowdown in the demand for their manufactured 
products due to the global slump, and hence has been receiving fewer work 
orders.  
 
Negotiating Migration and Factory Work 
 
Most of Batam‘s EPZ workers are like Ika. Eighty per cent of these workers 
are young women between the ages of 19-25, who arrive as migrant workers 
having travelled long distances from their rural homes in areas such as 
Sumatra and Java, in the hopes of finding work. The five women I interviewed 
were between the ages of 19-22 and have been working at PT Permata in 
BatamIndo for between eight months to two years, with this being their first 
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job, fresh out of high school education (SMA or Sekolah Menengah Atas) or 
university. 
 
19-year-old Endah, from Palembang, South Sumatra, has only been 
working at PT Permata for eight months. She explains that she comes from a 
large family with five siblings in a cramped home in her rural kampung 
(village). Influenced by her seniors in her high school, she and her friend 
decided to apply for a production operator job with the local TKI, and procured 
a job via an agency. Based on the advice of other friends who have completed 
the return migration to Batam, she applied for jobs in companies that were 
situated in BatamIndo because they mentioned that it was the best working 
environment with dormitories that were situated within the complex, so she 
can be sure that the accommodation would be arranged for her. Also, her 
friends related that the factories located within the complex are large MNCs 
that placed emphasis on staff welfare. Therefore, her decision to migrate was 
influenced by the experience of her seniors and friends who had work 
experience in Batam. As her family home was cramped, Endah, as the eldest 
daughter would be able to leave home, in search of independence. As such, 
her parents were also willing to allow Endah to migrate for work, as there 
were a few girls from the village who had also migrated to Batam for work and 
returned. Endah also thought that with her wages, she would be able to 
support herself and hence ease the burden on her parents. In fact, Endah 
admits that she does not remit money every month since with one mouth less 
to feed back home, her family had more disposable income. She said that 
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circumstances were still uncertain in the first year since she arrived and 
thought it better to save some money for herself first, before considering 
remitting money home. She is however saving for the airfare home for the 
upcoming lebaran (Aidilfitri) festival, and would also need more money to 
procure gifts (oleh-oleh) as well as some form of monetary contribution for her 
household. Endah admits that her one-million-odd rupiah salary is not much, 
and hence lives rather frugally, only spending when necessary, usually on 
food and toiletries. She is however looking forward to the lebaran bonus given 
out every year to staff which would range anything from 2 weeks‘ to a month‘s 
salary. 
 
Living in the dormitory: Surga, bareng, bebas, kangen 
 
Tenants of Batamindo ideally prefer their workers to stay in the 
on-site dormitories as the controlled environment is thought to 
put worker productivity less at risk than when they live outside. 
For example, given the limited availability of public transport on 
Batam, workers travelling into the estate from elsewhere on 
Batam might spend 20-30% of their wages on travel, reducing 
the budget available for a healthy lifestyle. Proximity also makes 
the workforce more flexible in terms of their availability for 
overtime. 
(Grundy-Warr et al, 1999:316) 
  
 
Though Peter (2008) highlighted that dormitory life in Batamindo is a ‗caged 
existence‘, this expression is used rather figuratively. The women are free to 
come and go and the 10pm curfew for outside visitors seems to be overlooked 
by the security guards. Interestingly enough, Ika jokingly describes living in 
the dormitory as akin to dwellers in heaven (penduduk surga), because of the 
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people who live in it. Most of them are all females who are young and in the 
prime of their lives, where they are the most productive. There are no babies 
or children amongst them, nor are there old folk. They never hear news of 
new births or deaths. They are far removed from the rest of Batam, being 
located far from town. Their clean rooms and the amenities that they enjoy, 
they admit are much better than what others get outside of the compound.  
 
In Mack‘s research on factory women in Batam, she looked at women 
living in three different types of housing, the dormitory, ruli and kost (rented 
accommodation shared by a group) and analyzed the dynamics between their 
interactions. She employs the use of Williams‘ concept of ‗structure of feeling‘ 
to show how these women create their own form of cultural identity using 
shared feelings and emotions, for example, referring to their housemates as 
sisters, and create a form of unity amongst themselves that is unique to them, 
something that they do not share with women from other parts of Indonesia. 
She described that their ‗structure of feeling‘ ―redefined past experiences and 
rejected an imposed multiculturalism, both corporate and pan-Indonesian‖ 
(Mack, 2007:176).  
 
Williams, a theorist on cultural studies, contributed the concept of 
‗structure of feeling‘, described as a component of the lived experience of a 
community that is above and beyond its experience of social institutions and 
ideology. It refers to the lived experience that resides in the everyday, 
seemingly mundane personal interactions and relationships. Williams later 
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redefined the terms as a structure of social experience that lies somewhere 
between the articulated and the lived experience of the community (Lawrence 
& Karim, 2007:180). 
 
In my interviews with the women about dormitory life, three main 
themes emerged most strongly and repeatedly in dealing with the anxieties of 
their migration experience: bareng (togetherness), kebebasan (freedom), and 
kangen (homesickness). These shared, everyday personal interactions and 
relationships give meaning to them in relating their experience as a young 
migrant worker in Batam. 
 
Firstly, the close bonds and communal spirit that is fostered and shared 
among them, which can be denoted from the phrase bareng which means 
‗together‘. Examples of such would be masak bareng which means cooking 
together or maem bareng which means eating together. Ika describes 
dormitory life in this way: 
 
It‘s nice to see us leaving work together (pulang bareng). When 
we arrive back at the dormitory, we will cook together (masak 
bareng), eat together (maem bareng) do laundry together (nyuci 
bareng), perform our prayers together (solat bareng) and bathe… 
(she pauses) on our own of course! 
(Ika, personal communication, 2009) 
 
 
In fact, Ika admits that she is very close to four of her friends, all of whom I 
interviewed, and they like to do a lot of activities together. She regards them 
almost like sisters, and this core network of people has helped her deal with 
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the unfamiliar loneliness of not having any family or kin in Batam. Though she 
enjoys the close bonds that she share with these women of varied ethnicities, 
coming from different villages, she explains that there is a downside from 
being too close. She always remembers some dear advice dispensed by her 
supervisor, Pak Wahyudi, from work whom she regards as a fatherly figure, 
―Having a close relationship with friends is important but do not get too close‖. 
At first she did not fully understand what he meant and thought that he was 
referring to courtship and dating. However she recently understood what he 
meant when her own close friend, Tuty, went back to her hometown after 
completing her two year contract with the company. 
 
Ika got very close to Tuty as they entered in the same batch two years ago. 
They are from different hometowns, Ika from Yogyakarta and Tuty from 
Sumatra, but despite their differences, both managed to bond as they both 
are devout Muslims who wear the jilbab (headscarf) and enjoy similar 
activities like going to the mosque for Quran recitals. 
 
I am always together (selalu bareng) with Tuty. Wherever Tuty 
goes, Ika will go. If the company organizes any sort of events, 
there will be Ika and Tuty. Wherever I want go, Tuty will always 
accompany me. We are very close, Ika and Tuty. 
 
(Ika, personal communication, 2009) 
 
 
Though both received a year‘s extension of their contract, Tuty decided to 
return home to settle down with her boyfriend back home with whom she has 
maintained a long-distance relationship. Their separation when Tuty left was 
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painful for both of them as they bade a tearful goodbye. Ika sighs and likens 
friendships to the ebb and flow of the waves, they enter and leave our lives, 
forever changing. Ika describes that it is not easy seeing her friends leave, 
having been there for more than two years, seeing her seniors leave. She 
feels that they are always reminded of their temporal and transient existence 
in Batamindo with the coming and leaving of her dear friends. 
 
This concept of bareng is their way of coping, forming a type of 
sisterhood bond with each other, since most of the women, being migrants 
who are away from their family, have to depend a lot on each other. Doing the 
seemingly mundane chores of cooking, doing the laundry, or watching 
television together is their way of coping with being away from home and their 
togetherness in these seemingly mundane chores highlights the close, 
supportive structure that these women provide to each other. 
 
The second theme that emerged when speaking to the women was 
kebebasan or freedom. All the women I interviewed claim that they enjoyed a 
higher degree of independence and agency as a result of the migration 
experience, being both financially independent as well as enjoying the 
freedom to socialize, unlike back home where they would be socially and 
morally policed by family, kin and community. Imah describes, 
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Over here, you‘ve got your freedom. Nobody really watches you, 
you‘re away from your parents, your family, and you‘re in the 
company of people who are about the same age as you, so they 
understand the concept of space and privacy. 
 
(Imah, personal communication, 2009)  
 
 
Though there is a security guard at the entrance of the dormitories, the 
women explain that no visitors are turned away and that even the 10pm 
curfew for visitors may be overlooked by the guards most of the time. Nobody 
really takes notice of when these women come and go because of the nature 
of their shift work, so it is not uncommon for women to be coming back late or 
leaving in the late evenings. The women are free to partake in any type of 
activities that interests them. Ika in fact is a soccer fanatic and follows the 
English Premier League closely. In her free time, she and some friends 
including Tuty get together at the field at the recreational centre to play 
women‘s soccer. Ika explains that back home, she may not have the luxury to 
take part in sports as she is expected to help with domestic duties at home, 
and furthermore, to her family, playing soccer is a male pastime, in which 
female participation is frowned upon. Therefore, Ika sees herself as having 
more freedom, other than not being policed when she leaves or come home, 
but also experiences the freedom to pursue her interests, like playing soccer. 
 
However, these women are mindful not to abuse the freedom that they 
enjoy. They do self-regulate themselves and their behaviour because of the 
concept of malu (shame) or sungkan (embarrassment) towards their friends 
for any outward displays of impropriety. 
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Even though we have no family or kin to watch over us, it of 
course matters what our friends think of us because they are the 
only people we have here and we rely on each other. We feel 
very malu and sungkan towards our friends, some may come 
from the same hometown or villages back home. People here 
talk, and gossip and nobody wants to be part of the gossip. 
 
(Imah, personal communication, 2009) 
 
Such gossip may be made up of girls having too intimate a relationship with 
their boyfriends or sometimes leaving the dormitory and not returning for a 
few days. The women agreed that though kebebasan can be viewed 
positively since the women get to achieve a greater sense of self, too much of 
it, for example pergaulan bebas (freedom to interact and associate), may 
result in what the women view as social problems such as getting pregnant 
out of wedlock or being distracted by outside influence so much that they lose 
interest in performing their jobs well. Though I did not get an opportunity to 
discuss the concept of malu with the women further, this concept of malu, 
shame and embarrassment among the migrants in Batam has been 
discussed by Lindquist (2009) at length. He emphasizes that  ‗malu  gains 
particular forms of valence as migrants engage in new forms of social 
interaction and moral boundaries become ambiguous‘ (Lindquist, 2009:13). 
He elaborates that malu can manifest itself in different forms, sexuality, 
religion or economic failure. Malu can also be mitigated by the use of 
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symbols, such as wearing the jilbab, to protect the dangers of social 
interaction so as not to attract undesirable male attention.9 
 
Lastly, in order to deal with their homesickness (kangen) these women 
seek familiar symbols that remind them of life back home. Imah, hailing from 
the hilly regions of Padang Panjang in Sumatra, loves visiting Bengkong, a 
hilly area in Batam: 
 
Bengkong, I have been there several times, about three times in 
the one year that I have been here. I don‘t know why but every 
time I go there, it feels like going home. Maybe it‘s because 
Bengkong is located in a high region. The Bengkong area is 
similar to Padang Panjang in West Sumatra or Bukit Tinggi, both 
of which I have to pass before I arrive at my village in 
Lubuksikaping. Aku kangen, pengen pulang kampong (I long, 
really long to return to my village). 
 
(Ika, personal communication, 2009) 
 
 
Warouw (2008), in his research on female factory workers in Tangerang, 
described the significance of rural values in shaping the marginalized urban 
subjects‘ perspectives on their existence in the city. 
 
In the factories of Tangerang, rural values and images become the 
source of tension in workers; adaptation to capitalist disciplines and 
their encounter with the factory regime becomes a medium 
through which  workers connect with the rural community, 




                                                 
9
 Lindquist‘s (2009) book entitled, The Anxieties of Mobility,  provides rich detail and analysis 
on the emotional economy of merantau (migration), especially in Chapter 2 where he uses 
BatamIndo Industrial Park as a starting point in examining the emotions of malu and liar.  
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In the case of Imah, she imagines the countryside, her place of origin, as 
symbolizing a peace of mind, when life was simpler. This is congruent with 
Warouw‘s ideas that these images are invoked when urban migrant workers 
complain about urban hardship and industrial pressure. Romanticizing the 
image of the countryside, these become ‗portable icons‘ (Warouw, cited in 






Evidently, the transition from their villages to working in an industrial park in 
Batam takes some getting used to on the part of the women. The women, at 
young ages of 19 to 22, have to undergo processes that habituate them to the 
factory regime – working in shifts, performing overtime, wearing uniforms and 
adhering to company rules and protocol. Living in a dormitory eased their 
transition as the women create a support structure that they provide for each 
other, as shown in doing common activities together (bareng). With the 
freedom (kebebasan) that they enjoy in Batam being removed from their 
families, the women self-regulate their actions and behaviour so as not to be 
shamed (malu) with their friends.  
 
The everyday, long term habituation to the factory regime results in a 
process of transition which incorporates the worker into the capitalistic mode 
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of production (Warouw, 2008). However, this incorporation is never complete 
since these women see their migratory employment in Batam as only 
temporary, with most of them returning to their villages after the end of their 
contract, usually after two or three years. Furthermore, throughout their 
sojourn in Batam, these women always seek to reconnect with their pre-
factory existence of life in the village. As shown via my interviews, the women 
experience homesickness (kangen) and ease it by seeking familiar symbols 
that serve as portable icons to reconnect them back to their home villages. 
 
In the next chapter, it is argued that women make the ideal workforce 
as they are assumed to be disciplined, nimble-fingered, careful and docile. I 
will explore how such a stereotype emerged by analysing the Indonesian 
discourse on women which affects the management‘s recruitment practices 
which in turn translates to gendered work practices on the factory floor.  
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Chapter 4 – Towards a Gendered Discourse of Work 
 
Women‘s Work in Export Processing Zones 
 
In recent times, the establishment of free trade zones and industrial estates in 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America has led to scholarly attention 
that is focused on women‘s industrial work. With the shift of many Third World 
countries to export-oriented production for global markets, Saptari (2000) 
highlights that scholars have focused on issues such as the ‗impact of new 
factories on labour force composition, the nature of the labour market, the 
gendered division of labour and class consciousness, and the relation within 
family structures‘. These issues arise within the context of multinational 
corporations, in collaboration with the state, taking advantage of and 
reinforcing women‘s structurally subordinated position within the labour 
market and the family by adopting ‗discriminatory hiring practices, paying 
women lower wages and placing them in repetitive monotonous tasks with no 
job security or advancement opportunities‘ (Saptari, 2000:148). 
 
In the 1990s, the gender composition manufacturing industries within 
FTZs shows a predominance of women. In numerical terms, according to 
Tjandraningsih (2000), the labour force participation of women is increasing. 
As explained in the previous chapter, women workers in these industries are 
mainly young and single in the 19-25 age group. The large-scale entry of 
women into these global factories brought with it a proliferation of literature 
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that attempted to explain and document this phenomenon. The salient 
questions that need to be asked in the context of this labour structure in 
export processing zones are: (1) why do manufacturing factories in export 
processing zones prefer to employ women? (2) What then are the 
concomitant effects of this large scale entry of women into these global 
factories? In the process of answering these questions, it is my contention 
that it is not simply a case of women being a source of cheap labour or 
women as being highly suited to factory work by virtue of being ‗nimble-
fingered‘ (Elson & Pearson, 1981) as there are deeper underlying processes, 
such as the discursive formation of gender and labour, that shape the current 
situation. 
 
According to Caraway (2007) theorists never fail to highlight two factors 
as crucial in generating the waves of feminization that swept through much of 
the developing world after World War II – changes in the new international 
division of labour (NIDL) and women‘s low wages.  
 
―In the late 1960‘s and early 1970s, multinational corporations began 
to relocate labor intensive assembly operations from developed 
countries to cheaper production sites overseas. At the same time, 
export-oriented industrialization (EOI) became the favored 
development policies in many developing countries. These twin 
occurrences generated higher demand for cheap and easily 
exploitable labor to fuel export drives. Since exporters competed in 
global markets, they were extremely sensitive to labor costs, with 
immense gendered consequences. Exporters were especially keen to 
hire women, because their subordination to men meant that they 
could be paid low wages. (…)EOI and patriarchy thus combined to 
make women the ideal workforce in countries hat relied on exports to 
propel industrialization drives‖ 




In the early 90s, scholars argued that the main factor driving the feminization 
of labour is due to the fact that women are a ready source of cheap labour. 
However, the argument that ‗women make cheap labour‘ can be overturned 
upon the premise that women can in fact incur extra costs that make their 
labour more expensive compared to men. For example in Indonesia, women 
received more generous overtime bonuses for night shifts than men, and 
women were entitled to two days of paid menstruation leave every month and 
three months of paid maternity leave with wages paid by the employer, rather 
than the state (Caraway, 2007). Despite the costs associated, employers 
remained keen to employ women. Hence the wage argument alone is 
insufficient to account for the preference for employing women for jobs in the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
One of the reasons why women are seen as ‗cheap labour‘ is that they 
are often thought to go into manufacturing work that is regarded as ‗unskilled‘ 
which justifies the lower remuneration. Furthermore, they are also stereotyped 
as having the innate ability to perform certain tasks in the factory such as 
sewing since they have already been domestically trained at home. However, 
this can be refuted because women‘s work in the manufacturing sector 
requires a lot of skill that demands training, and most tasks are not 
characteristics innately found in women or traditionally performed in 
households. To prove such a point, according to Wolf (1992), the proliferation 
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of institutes to train workers to sew proves that sewing is not an innately 
female characteristic. Furthermore, a factory manager of a semiconductor 
factory whom I interviewed, Yus, informed me that they employ about 80% of 
women in the factory and they perform tasks such as soldering, a skill that 
women probably never had to engage in traditionally at home. The women, 
who work as production operators, would have to undergo extensive training 
which teaches them skills like soldering and semiconductor assembly before 
they are able to work on the factory floor. Therefore, since there is a need for 
such skills, the work that they perform cannot be seen to be of lower skill 
compared to men. In fact these women were performing skilled work because 
excluding the factory managers or supervisors who were mostly men, the 
other men are described by the factory manager as being ‗buruh kasar‘, 
performing heavy, more labour-intensive work such as moving bulky items. 
 
One of the earliest arguments proposed by scholars in explaining the 
factory employers‘ preference for hiring women was by Elson and Pearson 
(1981) who argued that women‘s ‗nimble fingers‘ were the reason for their 
recruitment. This is further proposed by Chant and McIlwaine (1995) that 
‗women are thought to be more dexterous than men and capable of finishing 
work at high speed‘. Tjandraningsih, however, offers the explanation that the 
target-output system of factories may be the underlying reason why women 
workers are seen as being capable of working faster and being more 
industrious as well as being more disciplined. In such a system, only by 
working faster and harder can they obtain more money , and in this context, 
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the stereotype of women working harder and faster than men is not 
attributable to their ‗natural propensities‘ but instead is a consequence of the 
way the work is organized (Tjandraningsih, 2000:262). Yus also describes the 
shop floor as having boards that track the productivity of the operators and 
their teams, which are known as ‗key performance indicators‘ or KPIs to 
encourage the workers to strive to reach the targeted output as dictated by the 
work order set by the company. 
 
Caraway further unpacks and complicates these arguments stating that 
though they contain a grain of truth, women‘s low wages are only a partial 
explanation why employers in labour-intensive sectors hire women. How then, 
do we account for the feminization of labour? I borrow from her argument that 
‗gendered discourses of work—ideas about men and women as distinct types 
of labour—are necessary to explain the drive towards the feminization of 
labour. However, before I visit that concept, I find it necesssary to highlight 
why it is important to problematize and give focus to ‗gender‘ when dealing 
with labour migration studies, a position that was never emphasized until the 
contribution of ethnographic studies. 
 
In the next part of this chapter, based on my review of the literature, I 
argue that the feminization of labour in Indonesia is facilitated by institutions 
at three different levels: the state‘s ideology with regard to labour as well as its 
discourse on women; gendered recruitment practices at the factory 
management level, and lastly supply factors such as improved education 
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levels. These main factors facilitated the feminization of labour in 
manufacturing industries in Indonesia, where between the years 1971 to 
1994, the percentage of women involved in manufacturing work increased 
substantially from 37 per cent to 51 per cent (Caraway, 2007). 
 
The state played a major role in facilitating the feminization of labour at 
two levels. Firstly, the New Order state played an active role in demobilizing 
independent unions, and emasculating Islamic social and political 
organizations that opposed the expansion of women into manufacturing work 
by questioning the morality of the women with respect to their migration and 
factory work. Such was the case in majority-Muslim Malaysia in the 1960s and 
70s when an unprecedented migration of women to industrial towns was a 
socio-cultural shock for many, resulting in the labelling of factory women as 
minah karan (electric women) associated with loose morals and sexual 
promiscuity (Daud, 1985; Ong, 1987). However, in contrast to the case of 
Malaysia, the Islam practised in Indonesia does not place many restrictions on 
women‘s labour force activities, and this was a factor which facilitated the 
feminization of labour in the manufacturing industry in Indonesia. 
 
Further, what contributed to the hiring of women in the manufacturing 
sector was the production of the stereotypical image of women as ideal 
workers. I argue that the stereotypical, gendered image of the female factory 
worker is articulated at two levels. The first level is the state‘s discourse on 
gender which is articulated via the notion of kodrat wanita. Secondly, the 
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stereotypical, gendered image of nimble-fingered, docile female worker is 
articulated at the level of management discourse based on recruitment 
practices adopted.  
 
Lastly the rapid feminization of labour in Indonesia would not have 
occurred if not for the growth in the supply of better-educated workers. The 
New Order policies which promoted education resulted in a better-educated 
workforce across the board, both men and women. However, it is apparent 
that the availability of qualified, educated female labour greatly facilitated the 
feminization process in Indonesia. 
 
Bringing Gender to the Core: Recognizing the Sexual Division of Labour  
 
Mahler and Pessar (2006) argue that gender as a category has not gotten the 
focus or attention that it so greatly deserves within the study of labour 
migration studies. Their contention is that some researchers simply 
incorporated ‗gender‘ by inserting sex as a variable when collecting 
quantitative data. They maintain however that ethnographic scholarship has 
made significant contributions towards bringing gender centrally into the field 
of migration studies. 
 
Gender is the meaning people give to the biological reality that there 
are two sexes. It is a human intervention that organizes our 
behaviour and thought, not as a set of static structures or roles but as 
an ongoing process. People do ―gender work‖; through practices and 
discourses they negotiate relationships and conflicting interests. 
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Conceptualizing gender as a process yields a more praxis-oriented 
perspective wherein gender identities, relations, and ideologies are 
fluid, not fixed. 
(Mahler & Passer, 2006: 29) 
 
 
Therefore, gender should not be equated to sex as it is a principal factor that 
organizes social life, but in everyday discourse, it can be taken-for-granted as 
it may operate so seemingly ―naturally‖ that it escapes our awareness. 
Therefore, Mahler and Pessar argue that in order to ‗measure its effects we 
must first see gender operating‘. Furthermore it is important not only to 
recognize gender and how it operates, but explore or at the very least 
problematize it, as it cannot be viewed and analyzed in isolation, but rather, 
gender is dynamic and it ‗articulates with other axes of differentiation in 
complex ways‘ (Mahler & Pessar, 2006).  
 
Elias (2005) in her work on factory women in Malaysia also highlights 
the importance of applying ‗gender-sensitive lenses‘ to show that certain 
state-level or firm-level policies are rarely gender-neutral, as I will also 
propose in my discussion of the construction of women‘s roles in the 
Indonesian discourse of gender, as well as the discursive formation of 




The New Order State‘s repression of labour resistance (1965-1998) 
 
Part of the attraction that Indonesia has for international capital is its large, 
low-wage labour force. Robison (1986:71) points out that export-oriented 
industrialization require a higher level of state involvement in disciplining 
labour. While keeping wages low to maintain its comparative advantage, the 
New Order state sought to control the labour force by demobilizing unions. In 
an effort to lure foreign investors, the Indonesian government advertised one 
of the lowest average wage rates in Asia and proclaimed that workers were 
controlled by the state, which outlawed strikes. 
 
The New Order state played an active role in paralyzing unions and 
suppressing labour unrest. Following the alleged coup in October 1965 and 
the counter coup that brought Suharto into power, trade unions were banned 
and by 1973, Suharto formed the nominal union Federasi Buruh Seluruh 
Indonesia (FBSI)10. This newly formed labour union which represented all the 
remaining labour groups did not represent labour and its interests but rather 
existed to ‗demobilize rather than mobilize labour, on behalf of the state‘ 
(Hadiz, 1997: 92). 
 
Wolf (1992) further demonstrated that strikes and lock-outs were 
strictly forbidden by the government because they were not in harmony with 
the state philosophy of labour relations as listed in the Pancasila. According to 
                                                 
10
All-Indonesia Labour Federation, later renamed SPSI (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia or 
All-Indonesia Worker‘s Union. 
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the Pancasila state ideology, strikes were seen as being opposed to national 
development and irreconcilable to national goals and therefore, unnecessary. 
This has been much criticized by commentators such as the Asia Watch 
Committee who argued that Suharto attempted to stifle independent factory-
level workers‘ unions. The main purpose of Pancasila Labour Relations had 
been to obfuscate the inherent conflict of interest between labour and 
management and this inevitable dissent was thus condemned as being anti-
consensus. Therefore, being anti-Pancasila was tantamount to being 
subversive. Commentators lament that the climate of fear and intimidation is 
in itself an abuse of the rights of the workers in Indonesia. 
 
The authoritarian nature of state politics in Indonesia fits closely to the model 
of the ‗exclusionary labour regime‘ as practised in other East Asia and 
Southeast Asia countries especially in Singapore and Malaysia.  Therefore, 
by ‗depoliticizing‘ society, the Indonesian state in the 1970s demobilized 
labour movements by creating a tame union firmly under state control. With 
the weakness of the national union FBSI, there was hardly any opposition to 
employers hiring large amounts of female labour in their manufacturing 
factories. Caraway (2007) therefore argues that the demobilization of unions 
and political parties in the early 1970s set the political preconditions for 
feminization. The curbing of labour unions‘ activities effectively decreased the 
incidence of labour strikes and a docile labour workforce was an appealing 
feature for foreign investors. Therefore, the state had effectively designed a 
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policy to attract foreign investment by limiting the space of labour 
organization. 
 
Also, since Indonesia was a predominantly Muslim country, religious 
sanctions about women‘s proper role in society may affect socio-cultural 
views of women and curtail their employment in the manufacturing sector. 
This was especially the case in Malaysia in the 1970s. Such was the case in 
majority-Muslim Malaysia in the 1960s and 70s when an unprecedented 
migration of women to industrial towns was a socio-cultural shock for many. 
Factory girls were known as ‗minah karan‘ (electric women), being associated 
with loose morals and sexual promiscuity (Daud, 1985; Ong, 1987), as a 
reaction towards the social change that occurred in that time as a woman‘s 
economic role away from home was somewhat unheard of, since there would 
be no familial paternal figure to morally police these women. Caraway (2007) 
argues however that the Islam as practiced in Indonesia did not particularly 
restrict women‘s role in society and imposed few restrictions on their public 
activities. Even if religious organizations were to oppose social change, 
Suharto‘s active depoliticization of religious groups ‗successfully co-opted, 
neutralized, sidelined, or repressed the main Islamic organizations in the 
country‘ (Caraway, 2002: 162).11 
 
                                                 
11
 For a full, detailed discussion on the depoliticization of labour unions and Islamic religious 
groups, one may refer to Caraway‘s (2002) dissertation on ―Engendering Industrialization: 
The Feminization of Factory Work in Indonesia‖. 
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Indonesian Discourse on Gender 
 
Though Indonesia is a land of great ethnic and cultural diversity, it is still 
possible to discuss a gendered discourse which is national in character. 
Considering this may provide a theoretical grounding which can later be 
linked to the gendered discourses of work in the factory. 
 
Caraway (2007) discusses Indonesian gendered discourses as ‗national‘ 
instead of local (e.g., Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Balinese). According 
to her, though intrinsic cultural gender variations remain, an Indonesian 
discourse on gender has emerged via the formation of the national state 
which moulds gender relations via law, public policy and public decrees. She 
quotes Suryakusuma, who writes: 
 
… (an) all-pervasive state… provides the structure for the development 
of a specific gender ideology which provides the official definition of 




Caraway further provides evidence from Blackwood (1995) to bolster the fact 
that ‗gender representations emanating from state policies and programs, in 
conjunction with modernist Islamic discourse in national publications both 
create new gendered identities in Indonesia and partially eclipse local 
gendered practices‘, not discounting the fact that the Javanese influence is 
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very strong given Java‘s predominance in government and its cultural and 
political hegemony over other regions (Caraway, 2007:106). 
 
Wieringa (2003) writes that a clash of masculinities resulted from the 
political struggle between the Sukarno‘s Old Order state (1945-1967) and 
Suharto‘s New Order state (1967-1998), with both parties having their own 
contrasting ideas on the role of women and their ideal families. She writes 
that: 
 
The PKI had built a hybrid construct called the ―Manipol‖ family, 
composed of Sukarnoist and socialist rhetoric. The word ―Manipol‖ 
comes from ―Manifesto Politik‖, Sukarno‘s 17 August 1959 
independence day speech. Women in such ideal families supported 
their men as revolutionary fighters for a bright socialist future, while 
struggling along in their own women‘s organization, Gerwani, which 
also claimed a role in the national political arena. They combined 
political, socialist, and nationalist activities with their duties in the 
household. Suharto‘s development state consisted of families in which 
women were loyal wives and educators of children. They were 
responsible for the strict obedience of the family as a whole to the 
patriarchal, authoritarian, national ideology Suharto imposed on the 
nation. For this project, women‘s sexuality had to be controlled and 




Other writers like Tiwon (1996) also argue along similar lines that the New 
Order state adopted a discourse of separate but equal gender roles and 
emphasized the nurturing and selfless qualities of motherhood over other 
aspects of women‘s identities. She narrates this via the case of Kartini, a 
forward-thinking and revolutionary Javanese princess during the colonial 
times who epitomized the vision of women‘s proper place in society. The 
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Suharto regime however played down her active and independent qualities 
and instead produced an image of a nurturing and self-sacrificing Kartini that 
perfectly matched the New Order‘s discourse on women. The role of women 
in Indonesian society can be summarized in one term as suggested by 
Suryakusuma (1987), of ‗state Ibuism‘ which sanctions any selfless action 
taken by a mother in looking after her family, a group, a class, a company, or 
the state. Prior to the New Order regime, women were never defined as 
mothers or housewives, but the regime put in force this particular definition.  
 
A core element underlying the national discourse on women is the term 
kodrat wanita which can be loosely translated as a women‘s moral code 
(Wieringa, 2003:70) or divinely assigned female gender role (Nilan & Utari, 
2008:137). Kodrat comes up repeatedly in discussions about the proper roles 
of women. The kodrat of Indonesian women prescribed that they should be 
meek, passive, obedient to the male members of the family, sexually shy and 
modest, self-sacrificing and nurturing. To this end, their main vocation was 
wifehood and motherhood (Wieringa, 2003: 75). 
 
Hence Caraway argues that the kodrat sets a precedent in shaping 
dichotomous relations between male and female nature, which then gets 
translated to and is used to justify gendered practices in society, including in 
this work, the factory. She argues that ‗the subterranean foundation of 
gendered discourses of work in Indonesia is kodrat‘‘ (108). 
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Discursive formation of Gender and Labour – ―Men‘s Work‖ and ―Women‘s 
Work‖ 
 
Beechey (1988) attempts to analyze the complex set of changes which 
accompanied the feminization of labour. She considers some of the questions 
which arise when one attempts to analyse gender at work and to look at the 
processes of restructuring in gendered terms. She approaches these gender 
divisions by using a Marxist analysis of deskilling, and dual and segmented 
labour market theories. These tools of analysis are useful in an examination of 
manufacturing work rather than service work, which is relevant to my research 
of the feminization of labour in Indonesia, specifically the export-led 
manufacturing industry in Batam. She argues that gender relations are 
‗embodied‘ in the organization of production. Beechey makes several points 
and highlight several arguments that critique the Marxist analyses of deskilling 
and the dual and segmented labour market theories. The most important and 
relevant point that she brings up is that her contemporaries wanted to 
highlight the issue that the labour market is not a sexually neutral entity and 
that gender relations are embodied in the very organization of production. 
 
The argument that the labour market is not a sexually-neutral entity is 
premised on the fact (with underlying Marxian influence) that economic 
institutions are modelled and articulated with other institutions that sustain 
gender inequalities in modern capitalist societies, for example the family, the 
education system and the state. Secondly, gender relations are interwoven 
 79 
with production relations at the level of the labour process, and thus the 
division of labour itself embodies gender relations which are manifested in the 
system of occupational segregation. This fits in well with Caraway‘s (2007) 
conception of the feminization of labour and the nature of gendered work 
which emerges via the discursive formation of gender and labour. 
 
There have been paradigmatic shifts in the changes in the structure of the 
labour force and the organization of paid work in modern capitalist countries. 
The forms of restructuring have varied from country to country, but overall the 
division of labour has become increasingly internationalized, while new 
technologies have been introduced on a large scale. Indonesia is not removed 
from this fact. However, while Beechey (1988) talks about the move to de-
industrialize and towards service work which is the case for most advanced 
capitalist countries, countries like Indonesia have yet to reach that stage of 
deindustrialization now and are still following the export-led industrialization 
strategy. However it can be seen that the feminization of the labour force is a 
very important structural change, which happened to the advanced 
industrialized countries in the 1970s, but which Indonesia only experienced in 
the 1980‘s when it began to follow its export-led industrialization strategy. . 
 
When asked why females were the main production workers in the 
biscuit factory, the manager responded, ―After all, who makes the 
bread at home?‖ Probably no one, given the rice-based diet of most 
Javanese. 
(Wolf, 1992: 123) 
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An omnipresent fact of industrial life is the categorization of jobs in a factory 
as ―men‘s work‖ and ―women‘s work‖, since they seldom do the same jobs. 
Often, the literature suggests that such profound gender segregation is rooted 
in the gendered discourse of work. Caraway (2007) adopts the concept of 
‗gendered discourses of work‘ to capture these ideas that employers hold 
about men and women workers. 
 
Authors usually account for certain tasks being delegated to women 
either due to widely held stereotypes of women‘s abilities or that these women 
do innately posses certain traits that certain tasks are considered ‗women‘s 
work‘. For example, sewing is considered as women‘s work as it is a domestic 
task performed traditionally by women, who are believed to be ―nimble-
fingered‖. Caraway argues that whether the women actually possess these 
traits is irrelevant, but the crucial point is that the employers believe that they 
do. 
 
In order to account for this, Caraway argues that ‗the gendered worker on the 
shop floor is created in part through the discourses produced by the 
management about gendered workers‘. 
 
From a Foucauldian perspective the issue is not whether the women 
are patient, disciplined, and diligent but that the subject of the woman 
worker as patient, disciplined, and diligent worker is produced 
through discourse. 
(Caraway, 2007: 30)  
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Post-structural feminists have called for special attention to be paid to 
how gendered subjects are created relationally through discourse, giving rise 
to dichotomous relations between male and female workers. This view is 
reproduced several times in most of the works that I reviewed on women and 
factory work. Figure 4.1 below outlines the characteristics of male and female 
workers which come up repeatedly when discussing the gender segregation 
of work tasks in factories. 
 
Figure 4.1: Characteristics of male and female workers in binary oppositions 
 














Wolf (1992) also echoed similar sentiments. In her research site, females 
were mostly hired in industries such as textiles, spinning, garments and food 
processing whereas in contrast, males worked in jobs that required more 
physical exertion such as the bus, furniture and glassware factories. In 
predominantly female factories, males were assigned to jobs which were 
considered more mechanical, technical or perceived to be heavier work, while 
women were involved in menial, repetitive tasks because they are assumed to 
be disciplined and patient enough to perform these tasks.  
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While these themes are explored theoretically and proven via each writer‘s 
field research, how true is this within my research site? It is important to test 
whether such gender-segregated task relations exist, via my interviews with 
the factory managers. 
 
Discourse both structures how and forms a lens through which subjects 
in the factory view the labor process; discourse is both created and re-
created—and possibly changed—by practice on the shop floor. 
(Caraway, 2007: 30) 
 
It is not surprising that all five of the factory managers I interviewed 
echoed similar stances when asked why the factories preferred to hire mostly 
female factory workers and to explain the type of work that they perform. All 
five mentioned that for the labour force in their factories, females accounted 
for 80% of production operators, and males and females were seldom, or 
almost never, mixed to perform the same tasks. 
 
In the manufacturing factories located in BatamIndo Industrial Park, the 
female workers are young and single, aged 18-24, and reaching the age of 25 
will signal the end of their career. When probed why the factories preferred to 
hire young females, Yus explains bluntly: 
 
‗We hire most women at that age because we prefer to hire single 
women who wouldn‘t have familial responsibilities. When they do not 
have a family to return to, their time after work can be further put into 
overtime hours. This just makes more sense in terms of workers‘ 
productivity.‘ 
 
(Yus, personal interview, 2008)  
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In fact, because their basic wage rate is about 1 to 1.2 million rupiah a 
month, most of the workers supplement their income by putting in overtime 
hours. Two of the factories work in shifts and there are three, 8-hour-long 
shifts in total; 8am-4pm, 4pm-12am, and 12am-8am. These are production-
intensive factories, producing semiconductors and television tuners, so the 
high demand means that they continue to operate 24 hours a day. Working 
overtime is common amongst the workers, especially when there is pressure 
to meet the production targets and factory workers can expect to earn 
generous overtime pay of up to double their basic wage rate.  
 
The other factory deals with checking finished goods for quality control. As 
the work is not so intensive, their working hours are from 8am to 5pm. 
However, when there is pressure to meet deadlines, workers are expected to 
perform overtime in this factory as well. As this factory is not so labour 
intensive, the average age of the women is higher, and Pardjo explains that 
most of the workers in his factory are older women who have reached the end 
of their career in other factories. Therefore, almost half of the female workers 
in his factory are above 25. 
 
When asked why their factories prefer to hire mostly females instead of 
males, Fardi explains: 
 
Men are more impatient. In order to do a repetitive task, they will not do 
it properly. Maybe they can do well for the first few TV tuners, but to sit 
there for 8 hours doing the same strenuous task, they will get 
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impatient. But for women they will be more focused. The women will 
ensure that they do the work properly but also do it fast. Women are 
just better at these tasks that require focus. They are also patient to 
perform the same task over and over again for a whole shift. 
 
(Fardi, personal interview, 2008) 
 
Yus also argues, along  the same line of reasoning, that manual labour is 
suited to men, whereas menial, repetitive tasks are more suited to women: 
 
We need 3000 people in my company, to do that kind of job. Let‘s say 
that if the job is handled by men. The problem would lie in the clash 
between men and men. Men do not have the patience to perform these 
tasks and they may get angry or frustrated and they might vent their 
frustration on each other. In other environments like shipyards, yes, 
they need men because it is more to hard, manual work. Some jobs are 
suited for men, some job are suited for women. Female workers are 
better because they are more focused on doing their task well. 
 
(Yus, personal interview, 2008) 
 
Therefore in summary, whether young, single women are truly docile and 
nimble-fingered is irrelevant but it is significant that, at least within my 
research site ,  the factory managers do possess a stereotypical view of them 
and actively employ gender segregation techniques when assigning tasks for 
male and female workers. The argument for doing so is that according to 
them, there are certain tasks that are suited for males, such as tasks that 
require hard, physical labour like moving goods or maintaining the machinery, 
and other tasks that are suited for women, those that require focus and 
discipline. Therefore, women and men are defined in a series of binary 
oppositions as I have mentioned, careful/careless, disciplined/undisciplined, 
performing light work/heavy work, focused/unfocused. Such stereotyping is 
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justified by these managers as doing so, according to them, enhances 
productivity levels. Due to the competitive nature of global manufacturing, 
factories maintain high production levels at the lowest possible cost. Low 
wages explain part of the argument why they prefer to hire females, but the 
other argument is also that females are considered more docile, patient, 
disciplined and nimble-fingered than men and are therefore more productive, 
which makes ―rational‖ economic sense to these factory managers at the end 
of the day. Embedded within this stereotype of docility is the belief in the 
female kodrat , according to which women are believed to be meek, passive 
and obedient to the ‗male members of the family‘. In this case, the male 
members of the family are their factory supervisors who are mostly male. 
Women are also more self-sacrificing, and are more willing to perform 
overtime hours to meet targets. 
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Increased female labour force participation rates due to better educational 
levels 
 
One of the main factors that facilitated the increased female labour force 
participation rate in Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s was the improvement in 
women‘s educational levels. Caraway (2007) points out that the New Order 
regime emphasized and expanded primary and secondary schooling and the 
educational levels for both men and women rose substantially. This made the 
labour force appealing to large industrial employers as they preferred to hire 
employees with at least high school education. Caraway highlights data from 
1971 which show that at that time, nationwide, only 9 per cent of women and 
13 per cent of men between the ages of 15 and 19 had completed junior high 
school while 6 per cent of women and 12 per cent of men between the ages of 
20 and 24 had completed junior high school. However by 1980, there were 
large jumps in the percentage of senior high school graduates for both women 
and men and by 1990, when the export drive began to take off, between 24 to 
42 per cent of women in the 15-19 age group had completed junior high 
school and in the 20-24 age group, between 17 and 41 per cent of women 
had completed junior high school. 
 
The effect of the expansion of primary and secondary schooling was to create 
a pool of better educated workers, especially a ready pool of educated female 
workers. This therefore greatly facilitated the feminization of labour in the 




The aim of this chapter was to summarize the existing literature which 
accounts for the factors which facilitated the feminization process in the 
manufacturing industry in Indonesia. The main factors highlighted in this 
section were namely: the role of the New Order State in depoliticizing labour 
unions and religious organizations that may curtail female labour force 
participation rates, and also the fact that the expansion of educational 
opportunities under the New Order government resulted in increased female 
labour force participation rates due to women‘s better educational levels.  
Furthermore, the state‘s gendered discourse has shaped and defined the 
gender role of women. The latter can be said to influence the gendered 
discourse of work, where the gendered worker on the shop floor is created in 
part through the discourses produced by the management about gendered 
workers. This hence created the segregation between ‗men‘s work‘ and 
women‘s work‘. I have traced and analyzed this same gendered discourse as 
it is revealed in my interviews with the factory managers, who reiterated the 
stereotypes of females being better workers as they are more careful, 
disciplined and patient, compared to male workers who are careless, 
undisciplined and impatient.  
 
Therefore the Indonesian discourse on gender greatly affects the 
discourse on labour in factories. The kodrat outlines women as passive and 
this governs how they are to enact their gender performance in their work, 
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hence bracketing the limits of possibility defined for them. How then do 
workers react to factory disciplines, policies and dissatisfaction with their low 
wages? What happens when these women subvert their roles and employ 
their various techniques of resistance to revolt against the capitalist 
discipline? And how does the management account for such instances, when 
these women are believed to be a docile and disciplined labour force?  This 
will be the subject of my next chapter.  
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One of the most interesting themes in terms of the sociology of work, 
especially with regard to academic discussion of factory workers, is the issue 
of work discipline and the control of the labour force. Here we can witness the 
dynamics between capitalists (management) and labour (production workers) 
where the capitalists struggle to discipline and control the labour force, and in 
this relation of power, the labour force struggles in reaction to factory 
discipline. 
 
This chapter will deal with acts of resistance against the capitalist 
discipline. Resistance may manifest itself on different scales, from large 
macro-resistances to micro-resistances at the level of the everyday. Micro-
resistances may be thought of more as instances of ‗everyday resistance‘, an 
idea initially developed by James Scott: 
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Everyday forms of resistance makes no headlines. Just as 
millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so 
do thousands upon thousands of individual acts of 
insubordination and evasion create a political or economic 
barrier reef of their own. There is rarely any dramatic 
confrontation, any moment that is particularly newsworthy.... 
Their safety lies in their anonymity. It is also extremely rare that 
officials of the state wish to publicise the insubordination. 
 
(Scott, 1986:8)  
 
Scott‘s work on the everyday forms of peasant resistance in a Malaysian rice-
farming village marked a departure in the study of resistance, which usually 
dealt with more open, direct confrontations that typically dominate the 
literature. Scott justifies that this technique of resistance is suited for the 
agrarian class. He argues that the form of resistance that the agrarian class 
that he studied employed reflected the conditions and constraints in which 
they are generated. Due to the scarcity of resources and the precariousness 
of their livelihood, such acts need to be concealed and it is precisely due to 
the clandestine nature of their acts that go unnoticed that render them 
successful. Though his work was centred upon peasants and the struggle with 
class consciousness, his conceptualization of everyday resistance opened up 
the site of discussion when ruminating about the diversity in the forms of 
resistance. The idea of everyday resistance can then be applied in the context 
of the coping mechanisms of the factory workers where these techniques are 
used as ‗ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups‘ as has been done 
so by many (Daud, 1985; Ong, 1987; Wolf, 1992; Tjandraningsih, 1995; 
Andriyani, 1996; Smith and Grijns, 1997). 
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Numerous studies have detailed women‘s responses to their 
experiences of work in factories, including acts of ‗everyday resistance‘, which 
Ford refers to as ‗the women‘s daily, unorganized responses to the conditions 
under which they work‘ (Ford, 2003: 99). Much has been written about the 
‗everyday resistance‘ of women factory workers in Indonesia which include 
production slowdowns, frequent and extended visits to the toilet, absenteeism 
and episodic visions of ghosts and spirits (Andriyani, 1996; Smith and Grijns, 
1997; Tjandraningsih, 1995; Wolf, 1992). These acts of ‗everyday resistance‘ 
may escalate into the staging of spontaneous strikes or unjuk rasa 
(demonstrations of feelings) via mass absenteeism and stayouts as a form of 
overt labour strike. As much as these studies offer great insight into the 
coping, reactive strategies of these women against issues such as factory 
discipline, policies and low wages, a critique of these studies show that 
academics do not adequately define the term ‗resistance‘ nor problematize it 
as a concept. Healey further posits: 
 
Yet without a conscious expression of what constitutes 
resistance, analysts are often on shaky ground, in danger of 
foisting their own categories of thought and accompanying 




Healey‘s (1999) critique of Ong‘s (1987) seminal work on electronic factory 
workers is an example of ‗subjective ambivalence‘ (Ortner, 1995:175) in the 
conceptualization of resistance. Ong argues that that women‘s resistance to 
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their work conditions is manifest in spirit possession and hysterical outbursts. 
Healey argues however that ‗the outbursts are explained in highly 
individualistic terms‘ in which Healey perceives the possessed as acting 
‗unconsciously ‘and as a result ‗the observer (Ong) knows more than the 
possessed herself. Herein lies one of the problems of the definition of 
resistance which raises questions such as: does the act need to be intended 
as resistance by the actor (workers)? 
 
It is precisely this ‗subjective ambivalence‘ as well as the lack of consensus 
on the definition of the term ‗resistance‘ that prompted Hollander and 
Einwohner (2004) to review and synthesize the diverse literatures that invoke 




Hollander and Einwohner (2004) pointedly note that though there is a rapid 
proliferation of scholarship on resistance, there however exists little 
consensus on the definition of the term. Despite frequent scholarly usage of 
the term, many invoke the term resistance but fail to systematically define it. 
This is a major pitfall, since for the concept to be useful, it is important to 
define its conceptual parameters. Hollander and Einwohner hence attempt to 
review and synthesize existing literature on resistance and offer a conceptual 
definition of the term as well as providing a typology of resistance.  
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Hollander and Einwohner admit that there is diversity in the definition 
and manifestation of resistance. Reviewing the literature, resistance may be 
physical (working slowly, feigning sickness), or material (stealing from one‘s 
employer) or via other symbolic behaviour (oral narratives, dance) or even a 
lack of reaction (silence as a form of resistance). Resistance can also vary in 
scale, since acts may be individual (absence from work due to feigning 
illness) or collective (mass absenteeism). 
 
By documenting the diverse phenomena that have been referred to as 
resistance, Hollander and Einwohner note in particular that there are two 
recurring issues in the discussions about the definition of resistance: 
recognition and intent.  They use these two issues to develop seven distinct 
types of resistance in their typology. 
 
Hollander and Einwohner pose the question, ‗must oppositional action 
be readily apparent to others, and must it in fact be recognized as 
resistance?‘ They bring the example of Scott‘s (1985) research on peasant 
politics by drawing attention to what he calls ‗everyday‘ resistance. Scott 
argues that by virtue of lacking resources openly to protest against their 
superordinates, more common ―everyday‖ forms of resistance, for example 
foot-dragging, pilfering and sabotage, qualifies as a strategy of resistance.  
These techniques are low-profile and may go unnoticed by the powerful and 
hence unrecognized by the target as resistance. Hence the question: Does 
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resistance need to be recognized by the targets or observers in order to 
qualify as such? 
 
One of the most contentious issues in the scholarly discussion of 
resistance is the intent behind the acts of resistance: ‗must the actor be aware 
that she or he is resisting some sort of power—and intending to do so—for an 
action to qualify as resistance?‘ (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:542). This 
brings us back to the example that I have raised earlier of Ong‘s study on 
spirit possession amongst factory workers.  Does it qualify as resistance, even 
though the possessed may be acting ―unconsciously‖ (which in itself may be a 
point of contention)? 
 
Therefore utilizing the matrix of intent and recognition by actors, targets 
and observers, Hollander and Einwohner developed a typology of seven 
distinct types of resistance, namely: overt resistance, covert resistance, 
unwitting resistance, target-defined resistance, externally defined resistance, 
missed resistance, attempted resistance, and not resistance 12 , as 
summarized in table 5.1: 
                                                 
12
 For an insightful and more in-depth discussion of the various types of resistance, refer to Hollander 
& Einwohner’s (2004) work on ‘Conceptualizing resistance’ in Sociological Forum, 19(4):533-554. 
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Table 5.1: Types of resistance 
 
Source: Hollander & Einwohner, 2004:544 
 
 
 Using the above matrix as an analytical tool of enquiry, Scott‘s (1985) use of 
‗everyday resistance‘ can be classified as a type of covert resistance  in which 
acts go unnoticed by the target, though they can be recognized as resistance 
by other culturally aware observers. Also, in the case of Ong‘s (1987) 
research, incidents of spirit possession by the workers may be either 
classified as externally defined resistance, acts that are neither intended nor 
recognized by the target but labelled as resistance by third parties, if the spirit 
possession is deemed an unconscious act or again, covert resistance if 
indeed their action is consciously intended to be an act of resistance. Other 
than categorizing the diversity of acts of resistance, the matrix also defines 
that if a certain act is not intended by the actor as resistance or recognized by 
the target or observer as resistance, it is definitely not a form of resistance. 
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Therefore in my research in analyzing the labour relations between 
capitalists (management) and labour (workers), I collected my data not only 
by interviewing the factory workers, in order to understand their subjectivities 
and exercise of agency in the ‗intent‘ of their resistance, I also interviewed 
factory managers so as to understand what they understood or recognized as 
acts of resistance by the workers. In doing so, I would be able to take the 
analysis to a higher level by categorizing the types of resistances occurring 
and how this affects the power dynamics between labour and capital.  
 
The Capitalist Discipline 
 
In analysing struggles between management and labour, I apply Foucault‘s 
theory of disciplinary power to both the labour process as well as the ‗body 
and psyche of the labouring subject‘ (Sakolsky, 1992:114). 
 
Sakolsky defines Foucault‘s concept of ‗discipline‘ such that: 
 
Discipline may be identified neither with an institution nor with 
an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, 
comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, 
levels of applications, targets; it is a ―physics‖ or an ―anatomy‖ of 
power, a technology. 
(Foucault, 1979:215 in Sakolsky, 1992:114)  
 
 
Sakolsky also posits that capitalism can be analyzed in Foucauldian terms as 
a power/knowledge regime, which employs the use of ‗discourses‘ to 
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legitimize the labor process and ‗disciplinary practices‘ applied on the body 
and psyche of the labouring subject in order the control the mode of 
production.  
 
One of the disciplinary techniques in the early factories was the 
‗disciplinary gaze‘ derived from Bentham‘s Panopticon. Surveillance has since 
become a mainstay in managerial function in modern factories today. In fact, 
the modern factory still employs Taylorism as a form of scientific management 
of its workers, with supervisory surveillance of its workers to ensure 
productiveness, the prescription of standard operating procedures and 
ensuring the standard of productivity by employing and disseminating 
information such as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that track the 
productivity of each worker.  
 
It is also argued that disciplinary practice is a site, not a source of 
power. Therefore, as much as capitalists are able to assert their repressive 
power in order to demand compliance from the labouring subject, the power 
can be productive and conducive, on the part of the workers, to certain forms 
of dissent. For example, while the capitalists arrange the women in close 
proximity on assembly lines on the factory floor to effectively monitor their 
productivity, this proximity also enables them to form solidarity and react 
against factory policies together, employing techniques such as production 
slowdowns. As I shall show, female workers, via their everyday practices, find 
various means to show their dissatisfaction towards the management.  
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Indonesia‘s Industrial Relations System During the New Order 
 
The New Order government was determined to control the trade union 
movement and minimize labour unrest. Manning (1998) highlighted three 
developments that affected the industrial relations processes: the destruction 
of the communist party (PKI) and the ascendency of the military, the banning 
of the leftist union (SOBSI) and the removal of its leaders from industrial 
relations, and a severing of ties between unions and political parties (except 
ruling GOLKAR party). There was heavy curtailment of labour rights through 
government controls and a military intervention in industrial relations. 
 
After a period of political consolidation, an ideological framework of 
Pancasila labour relations was agreed upon by ‗approved‘ union leaders, 
government and employer representatives to guide labour management 
relations. Underlying this was a rejection of an adversarial approach to conflict 
resolution between workers and management. Instead, the emphasis was on 
common goals, cooperation and conciliation based on family principles 
(kekeluargaan). Indonesia followed the international trend towards tripartite 
and bipartite industrial relations systems and employer and union 
cooperation. 
 
The Suharto regime opted for a government-controlled, national trade 
union organization, the All-Indonesia Labour Federation, FBSI (later the SPSI) 
in 1973. It was modelled on national unions in other countries, such as the 
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National Trade Unions Congress in Singapore and the Federation of South 
Korean Trade Unions (Hadiz, 1998). The national body was entrusted with 
coordination role, determination of policy and support for the establishment of 
enterprise unions and the completion of collective labour agreements. Since 
its establishment it has become a large organization, and membership 
amounted to approximately one million in the early 1990s, and unions were 
represented in approximately one-third of all larger enterprises. However, only 
3-5 per cent of all employees and 5-10 per cent of manufacturing employees 
were nominal members of a union in the early 1990s, a level of unionization 
lower than during the Sukarno period (Manning, 1998). 
 
Therefore, promoting the interests of employers and workers depended 
on the government‘s willingness to allow the SPSI to develop as an 
independent body, and resolve disputes on behalf of its members. However, 
the SPSI emerged rather as a tool for the government control of organized 
labour, rather than representing the workers‘ interests in negotiating with 
employers. 
 
Manning (1998) illustrates that the number of strikes was tiny in the 
period from the 1950s to the late 1970s, but grew significantly in 1979-1982 in 
response to a spate of retrenchments and the rising cost of living associated 
with inflation. Partly in response to actions taken by a new hard-line Minister 
of Manpower, it declined again to low numbers for the rest of 1980s. However, 
the labour peace did not last until the 1990s. There was strong criticism 
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regarding the government‘s labour record as manufacturing exports took off in 
the late 1980s. With increased strike activity that followed the economic and 
political crisis, state officials realized the limitations of a strategy of control 
based on repression. Therefore, the ―carrot approach‖ of improving labour 
standards by increasing minimum wages 13  was combined with the stick 
approach (Hadiz, 1998).  
 
Labour Policy and Industrial Relations in the 1990s 
 
Manning (1998) highlights that there were two important developments in 
labour policy and industrial relations in the 1990s: firstly, the attempt by the 
government to implement minimum wage policy and labour unrest. Both were 
mainly the products of two forces: a larger, concentrated, better-educated and 
volatile workforce and the stagnation of wages in the 1980s. This was also 
accompanied by a belief that workers — the heroes and heroines of 
Indonesia‘s success -- had been abandoned by the government to the whims 
of market forces. A brief move towards greater political ‗openness‘ 
(keterbukaan) and tolerance of dissent also encouraged labour action. In the 
Post-Suharto era, legislation regulating industrial relations underwent 
significant changes where the Habibie administration ratified International 
Labour Organization (ILO) conventions on workers‘ basic rights14. This was 
                                                 
13
 With the government‘s effort to raise minimum wages, by 1997, the minimum wage in terms 
of the rupiah was three times of that in 1990 though it was still only at about US$2.50 per day 
(Hadiz, 1998).  
14
In 1998, Indonesia ratified the ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize (Hadiz, 1998). 
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seen as a positive step towards creating a fair platform for industrial relation 
negotiations, which would be internationally more acceptable with regard to 
protection of workers who form or become members of labour organizations 
whose main aim is to protect the interest of workers.  
 
In recent years, the legitimacy of Indonesia‘s industrial relations 
framework has been challenged by the proliferation of independent organizing 
groups. With further deregulation, the number of labour organizations in 
Indonesia has exploded. Rahayu and Sumarto (2003) reports that by 2001, 
there were 61 national labour union federations, more than 144 labour unions 
and approximately 11,000 registered enterprise unions, with a total 
membership of about 11million workers.  
 
Labour Unions in Batam 
 
According to the women and the factory managers that I interviewed, 
company unions do exist in their factories but they are simply there in form 
only. Unions are not allowed to educate workers on their rights, and they can 
intervene only at the workers‘ request (Wolf, 1992). The unions however, 
usually organize recreational activities like sports competitions, for example 
indoor soccer. Unions also organize day trips to places of interest on the 
island. Ika mentioned that the company previously chartered transportation 
and brought its employees to SIJORI resort on the west coast of the island for 
a day of recreational activities. According to Mills (1999), extra-firm gatherings 
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like these became a way for unions to promote solidarity and foster firm 
loyalty. 
 
Recently, labour unions such as FSPMI (Federasi Serikat Pekerja 
Metal Indonesia)15 and SBSI-Lomenik (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia - 
Logam, Mesin, Elektronik) 16  are more active in representing the rights of 
precarious workers in Batam. FSPMI which started out in 2001 has organized 
25,000 workers while Lomenik has organized 24,000 (Peter, 2008). They 
recruit members by organizing roadshows as well as sending representatives 
to meet with workers to talk about joining the union. Such labour unions 
receive support from international federations such as IMF (International 
Metalworkers Federation) and Swedish IF Metall (Peter, 2008). In December 
2008, FSPMI organized tens of thousands of its members by demonstrating in 
front of Riau‘s Government office demanding a raise in minimum wages. 
During the demonstrations, several people were injured and hospitalized as 
the government mobilized military personnel to stem protests. However, so far 
no satisfactory agreement has been reached but organizers of FSPMI remain 
focused on protecting the rights of its precarious workers (Good Electronics, 
2009). In light of such a harsh crackdown upon union demonstrations, it is no 
wonder that women workers are apprehensive about joining the labour 
unions. All the workers I interviewed said that they have not joined a labour 
union outside of their company as they are afraid that partaking in union 
activities may put their employment at risk. Even though they do agree on 
                                                 
15
 Indonesian Federation of Metalworkers Union 
16
 Federation of Metal, Machine and Electronic Workers 
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issues such as raising the minimum wages of workers, they find their 
employment to be more important and do not want to lose their jobs. 
 
Therefore, with weak representation from corporate labour unions and 
their aversion towards joining an external labour union, how do these women 
workers air their grievances? What types of resistance do these women 
employ? 
 
Subverting Essentialized Feminine Passivity 
 
Sears borrows Moi‘s (1985) succinct definition of ‗femininity‘, ―that which is 
marginalized by the patriarchal order‖. Sears finds this definition useful as she 
posits that women are situated at the ‗margins of symbolic order, the domain 
of language, beyond which lies chaos‘. She posits that the women‘s agency is 
sited in their subtle acts of daily resistance: 
 
Resistance is encoded in practices of remembering, and of writing. 
Agency is then figured in the minute, day-to-day practices and 
struggles of third world women. […] If we can speak of agency at all, 
and we must if we want to hold on to the possibility for the 
articulation of partial, particular truths, then these day-to-day 
historical enactments of agency and autonomy must be possible at 




These concepts of constituting the feminine subject are useful to my current 
project as I articulate the agency of female migrant factory workers vis-à-vis 
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their daily rituals and practices, as has also been highlighted by Tiwon (1996). 
In her chapter ‗Models and maniacs‘ she conjures images of women as they 
are projected in several old literary traditions to show how they were 
perceived as dangerous, chaotic and violent. Interestingly, she tells of Ratmi, 
an independent, strong-minded, outspoken woman, and her friends who work 
in a factory and live in a dormitory. After confiding in each other and finding 
that they have been mistreated, they and 800 other women in the asrama 
(dormitory) went on strike, without fear of their supervisors or the police. It is 
interesting, then, to revisit the ideal concept of a factory worker: factories 
preferred to hire women because they are presumably docile and easy to 
control but strikes on the part of these women show that they possess a 
strong form of agency to resist their mistreatment.  
 
In line with the above, Tjandraningsih (2000) notes that despite the 
marginalization of women in factories, ‗one of the most remarkable changes in 
the consciousness of women workers is their increasingly militant resistance 
to factory policies that they feel are ―disadvantageous‖‘. Based on her 
previous fieldwork in various Indonesian factories, she notes that forms of 
individual resistance that occur on a daily basis include ‗slowing down of work, 
prolonging toilet visits, and arguing with bosses and calling them names‘ 
(Tjandraningsih, 2000:265), an issue that will be largely dealt with further in 
this chapter. She also notes that since the early 1990s, individual resistance 
has gathered momentum and has taken on a more collective and manifest 
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form, such as holding demonstrations in front of government offices on issues 
such as the demand for the increase in wages. 
 
For Wolf (1992), her experience from her research site in factories in 
Java shows that there were four different forms of female labour resistance 
beyond verbal complaints: walkouts, production slowdowns, stayouts, and 
visions of ghosts and spirits. Like Ong, Wolf also suggests that visions of 
ghosts and spirits are a subconscious strategy of resistance. Since the factory 
women were shy, they appropriated forms of resistance that were culturally 
acceptable in Java, by drawing upon culturally based images to legitimize the 
expression of some form of protest.  The evidence shows that the women do 
possess a great deal of agency in reacting towards unacceptable factory 
discipline and policies.  
 
Relating back to my fieldwork, the five factory managers whom I have 
spoken to described the techniques of resistance employed by factory 
workers. Yus and Fardi lament that female factory workers are usually easily 
dissatisfied when it comes to the yearly review of their salaries and will make 
known their dissatisfaction in actions of various degrees, from the subtle to 
the overt. 
 
From my interviews with the factory managers, they highlight that there 
were also four different forms of female labour resistance that may be enacted 
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in succession: (1) production slowdown, (2) refusal to perform overtime hours, 
(3) mass absenteeism and lastly (4) labour strike. 
 
Yus is currently a manager in an American-based company that 
produces semi-conductors and has worked there for a year. Previously, he 
had worked for four years in a different factory which also produced semi-
conductors. He explains that the main issue that workers are dissatisfied 
about is their salary. He describes the process of the yearly salary reviews: 
 
Usually we will begin discussions on the yearly reviews between 
the months of September and October. The salary increase will be 
made known in the months of November or December and will be 
implemented in January the next year. This salary increase is state-
directed and it is mandatory for our companies to review salaries 
yearly. Which is why much resentment is shown towards the end of 
the year as this is when they will know how much the increase is. 
 
(Yus, personal interview, 2008)  
 
As a researcher, I was initially confused as to why a salary increase across 
the board would leave workers dissatisfied. Yus explains: 
 
The dissatisfaction occurs when a worker who has worked there for 
a few years, realizes that a new worker would be paid the same or 
even more than her. To them, it is unacceptable because they have 
worked there longer and are more experienced and should be paid 
more than newer workers. For example let‘s say a worker, 4 years 
ago was paid the minimum wage of 1 million rupiah (S$130) a  
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month and let‘s say she has enjoyed a 5% increase in her pay over 
4 years, so she will earn about 1.2 million rupiah (S$150) now. But 
sometimes the government will implement a new minimum wage 
for new workers, let‘s say that all new workers are to be paid a 
minimum of 1.2 million rupiah. Now can you see why they are 
dissatisfied? 
 
(Yus, personal interview, 2008) 
 
Yus has experienced worker unrest rather frequently in his previous company. 
Over a period of four years with the company he had witnessed 3 worker‘s 
strikes.  
 
Fardi has worked in his current company for three years, also as a 
factory manager. His is an American-based company that produces TV 
tuners. As recently as late last year, he experienced the biggest organized 
labour strike that his company has ever faced. This was because his company 
was due for a merger with another company and the workers expected some 
form of compensation or bonus out of the collective merger agreement. When 
the workers realized that they might not receive compensation for the merger 
and when talks with the management were futile, this culminated in a three-
day labour strike. All the factory‘s workers participated, which included its 
3000 female production workers, the male workers who were mainly working 
as buruh kasar (labourers who perform heavy duty work such as shifting 
goods) and factory supervisors (who were mostly male, with some females) 
as well. The strike lasted for three days, with the workers turning up for work, 
but not performing any labour. They just stood or sat around in the open areas 
of the factory compounds, some holding up placards or posters to voice out 
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Illustration 5.1: Workers on strike in an American-based factory in Batam, 
pictures courtesy of Fardi. 
 
Of course, the women do not simply protest by organizing a labour strike at 
the outset. The labour strike represents the culmination of their protest when 
all other avenues have failed. When verbal complaints do not succeed, 
different means of protest are employed in succession, from decreased 
productivity, refusal to perform overtime, mass absenteeism and then lastly 
the labour strike.  
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Firstly, as a sign of protest, the women would purposely decrease their 
productivity to affect the targets of the company. However, this technique may 
only be effective for minor issues, for example some company policies that 
the women may not agree upon. Ika mentioned that sometimes, it would be 
difficult to obtain sick leave from the management even though they were so 
ill that they were not able to perform their work properly. Ika experiences 
painful menstrual periods and even though the company offers menstrual 
leave for its workers, obtaining leave may not be easy. Obtaining a referral 
letter to visit the clinic is a long-drawn-out process as the worker has to pass 
through the hierarchy, approaching her group head, supervisor and later her 
administrative officer. She explains that in the beginning when her supervisors 
were reluctant in giving their approval, she would work slowly to show that her 
illness is affecting her ability to work. She did notice that subsequently, it got 
easier for her to obtain sick leave since her supervisor would know of her 
condition. Even though on one hand, lowered productivity levels due to really 
being sick can hardly be conceptualized as a technique of resistance, 
however, her conscious effort to work slowly can be seen as intended 
resistance on her part. Ika‘s production slowdown is a micro-resistance that 
she enacted on her own on the everyday level that may go undetected. 
 
Production slowdowns may be a macro form of resistance. Endah 
relates that sometimes as a group, her assembly line would purposely 
decrease their productivity levels when they feel reproached by the fault-
finding management who complain that they are not hitting the performance 
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targets set. Also workers sometimes slow down their production levels when 
work orders are low so that they will be able to perform overtime hours. Endah 
relates that with the economic slowdown there is not enough demand for their 
products and hence overtime hours are not required. However, for most 
workers overtime pay may make up to 50 per cent of their basic wage, which 
they find important to supplement their salary. 
 
The second technique that the women employ is resistance by refusing 
to do overtime by going home promptly when their shift is over. The factories 
rely greatly on overtime performed by these workers as there is great 
pressure to meet their production targets. After 8 hours on their shift, most of 
these factory workers will work another extra 2 to 4 hours of overtime, which 
earns them double their wage rate. The factory managers feel that it is more 
cost effective for the company for their production operators to perform 
overtime instead of hiring more staff. Furthermore, Yus explains that his 
factory, which has a total of 3000 production operators, has already hired 
enough employees at its maximum capacity. Therefore, when these women 
refuse to perform overtime, the production target of the company suffers, and 
the women hope that the upper management would take notice and start 
addressing the issues. Yus does not deny that there‘s a strong sense of 
camaraderie amongst the women, reminiscent of Tiwon‘s example of Ratmi, 
where the women came together to champion their cause. Such an attempt is 
effective only when the women band together and represent logic in numbers. 
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When their issues are still not sufficiently addressed even though the 
women are not performing overtime hours, they may take more drastic 
measures such as mass absenteeism. Since not coming in for three 
consecutive days is grounds for dismissal, the workers will come for two days 
and be absent for the third. This way, they are not liable for dismissal in terms 
of company rules, yet make their grouses known to the upper management 
and indicate that they are serious about furthering their cause. 
 
Fardi suggests that oftentimes, it takes some time for the upper 
management to come to a decision in addressing the issues of these workers 
as there are various levels of higher management that they would have to go 
through to make sure that certain policies are cleared for approval. 
Discussions and meetings may drag out for months. It is usually in this case 
that workers become impatient and their protests culminate into a workers‘ 
strike. As mentioned above, workers will turn up for work but will just stand or 
sit around the open compounds of the factory and will continue to do so until 
their demands are met. 
 
There seems be an inherent contradiction in the logic of the resistance 
posed by these women. I have shown with evidence from other researchers 
as well as my own findings from my research site that employers are keen to 
employ women as production operators because they are believed to be the 
ideal workforce: docile and disciplined. How then do factory managers 
account for these forms of protest that the women engage in? This was a 
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question that I posed to the factory managers, to which I got a very frank 
response. 
 
Both Fardi and Yus feel that these women wouldn‘t have been able to 
organize these forms of protests on their own. They believe that for every 
protest, the women are acting on orders from their male supervisors. If these 
workers do not act upon their orders, their jobs may be on the line, so both 
Fardi and Yus are of the opinion that the women are compelled to act as such: 
 
It‘s always the men (male supervisors) who ‗buat kacau‘ (stir up 
trouble). The key to running a smooth factory is keeping these 
supervisors happy. But I believe that these women are not acting 
on their own. There must be a man who is organizing them. 
 
(Yus, personal interview, 2008) 
 
Whether this is true, I admit I am unable to prove since my research still lacks 
evidence from interviews with factory women who have engaged in labour 
strikes as well as data on how such collective action were organized. The 
women I spoke to have never participated in such company level strikes nor 
even dare to join a labour union outside of their company, signalling fear at 
some level on their part. However, it seems to me that the factory managers 
have again internalized the rhetorical patriarchal argument that women are 
meek and passive and are obedient to males who are of a higher position. 
Whether it is the case is yet to be proven, but I think this argument should not 
be used to discount the agency of these women, for they are not automatons, 
 113 
but individuals who possess the agency to make their own decisions about 
whether to participate in a protest or not. 
 
Evidence from my interviews show that women workers are able to 
organize themselves by employing certain techniques of resistance such as 
production slowdowns. This therefore argues well for the high degree of 
agency on the part of the women to take action to show their dissatisfaction. 
Perhaps the women were more willing to talk about more covert forms of 
resistances that may go undetected by the management as these techniques 
are more suited to their purposes, being less likely to endanger their already 
precarious employment. 
 
Of the women I interviewed, perhaps their aversion towards joining 
labour unions and overt labour action also stems from the militant crackdown 
on female activists, the most publicized being the case of Marsinah, a young 
woman who led the strike at her watch factory, PT Catur Putra Surya in East 
Java, who was brutally kidnapped, sexually assaulted and murdered in 1993. 
Hadiz (1998) comments that though the perpetrators have never been 
brought to justice, it is widely believed that she was the victim of actions taken 
by the local military to quell labour unrest. 
 
More recently, in March 2009, two Indonesian sisters were jailed as a 
result of their union activities. The sisters have reportedly been fighting to 
secure ongoing employment for all 152 employees of PT Takita 
 114 
Manufacturing but it is believed that the firm targeted them with false charges 
of falsifying medical claims. They were threatened with immediate dismissal 
and forced to sign statements agreeing with the charges. The forces 
statements were taken to the police and the sisters were remanded in March 
3. Labour organizations such as FSPMI are working to secure the release of 
the women (Farley, 2009). 
 
Therefore my research shows that, while women workers are stereotyped as 
a docile workforce, there is evidence that they are able to employ varying 
degrees of resistance when faced with issues such as strict management and 
arguing for higher wages. They do possess some small degree of autonomy 
and agency to redress injustices, but prefer less militant action such as 
production slowdowns and absenteeism instead of joining unions and 




...sex is not a prior nature or an inner essence which determines 
gender as its effect. Quite the reverse: gender identity is 
performance, a repetitive behaviour within the limits of discursive 
gender specifications—in this case a performance of univocal 
sex/gender… Performance, in turn, creates the impression of a 
given or interior nature… which, like a textualized intention, is 
thought to be expressed in and by the performance. 
 
(Strozier, 2002: 87 on Butler)  
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The gendered discourse of work is maintained and reproduced in the 
everyday practices of the actors who perform their ‗ideological‘ traits. 
Therefore these discourses, once produced, become embedded in institutions 
and gain their materiality by becoming part of everyday life and shaping the 
relations within it. I have shown that the gendered discourse on work in 
Indonesian factories cannot be divorced from the patriarchal Indonesian 
discourse on gender, with the notion of kodrat governing hegemonic ideas on 
the ideal role of women in society. However, in the case of my research, 
normative femininity is challenged when these women subvert their docility 
and challenge the capitalistic discipline by, in essence, ‗performing out of their 
supposedly scripted performance‘ via their various forms of protest. The 
factory managers may try to argue that these women are not inherently 
subverting but merely acting on orders from their male supervisors, but this 
should not discount the power and agency that the women possess when they 
decide to participate in these forms of protest. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
Summary of the Dissertation 
 
I have outlined how trade reforms during the New Order years set Indonesia 
on a path of import substitution industrialization (ISI) and later in the 1980s, 
towards export oriented industrialization (EOI). Factories were compelled to 
reduce labour costs as much as possible in order to compete and Indonesia 
appealed to investors as it possessed strong comparative advantages with its 
large labour surplus and low wages. My review of the feminist literature show 
that while many argue that this EOI strategy caused the feminization of 
manufacturing industries, I however, concur with Caraway (2007) who argue 
that the feminization of labour in Indonesia preceded the EOI strategy. 
Feminization unfolded in a series of waves, first pioneered by the textile 
industry during the ISI years and the second wave later by the plywood 
garment industries. The final, most significant wave was propelled by 
footwear but more significantly the electronics sector, where investors 
preferred to hire women in the electronics sector. 
 
In my attempt to provide a nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between changing industrial policies and gendered employment patterns, I 
highlighted that several institutions and factors have facilitated the 
feminization process of the manufacturing industry in Indonesia. As 
‗permissive institutions‘ (Caraway, 2007), the state and the factory 
management via its discourse on women create the gendered worker. 
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In terms of supply factors, the New Order state also made the labour 
force appealing to foreign investors by demobilizing labour independent 
labour unions and outlawing strikes and demonstrations. Hence, Indonesia 
was able to maintain its comparative advantage of providing large numbers of 
workers, especially women workers at low, minimum wages. The state‘s 
education policy between the years of 1980 to 1995 accelerated educational 
gains for women, which contributed to their expanding labour force 
participation. 
 
All the above can be represented diagrammatically in a timeline below 
in order to depict the waves of feminization that occurred together with the 




Connell (1987) posits that the ‗globalization of gender‘ can be 
understood by analyzing the relationships between the gender regimes of 
institutions, and the gender orders of local societies. Therefore, the discourse 
of women as articulated by institutions such as the state and factory 
management further elucidates our understanding of the feminization process 
as well as unravelling how the gendered worker on the shop floor is produced. 
Despite the above institutions‘ key role in the construction of women as low 
wage, disciplined and docile workforce, my research shows that female 
factory workers are able to exercise some form of agency and resistance to 
the structures of the capitalistic factory discipline. 
 
An interesting point is that following the fall of Suharto in 1998, workers 
and activists pushed for greater freedom to organize as pressure grew for the 
unravelling institutional arrangements of state-labour relations during 
Suharto‘s rule. Recently in Batam, labour unions such as FSPMI and Lomenik 
have been active in championing workers rights. The main issue facing 
workers now is that it takes more than the current minimum wage for a worker 
to subsist in Batam as these wages are eroded by rising living costs. FSPMI is 
urging Indonesian government officials to stop exploiting and victimizing 
Batam workers for the sake of attracting new investors and meet the 
independent labour union‘s demands for the increase of minimum wages.  
 
In December 2008, tens of thousands of FSPMI members 
demonstrated in front of the Riau Governor‘s office in Batam to demand for 
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such an increase. The problem with this struggle is the incongruent 
differences between the main stakeholders on what the minimum wage 
should be. FSPMI is struggling for a minimum wage of between US$135 to 
150. APINDO (Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia) which represents the 
Indonesian employers proposed US$96 a month, while the government 
suggested US$100 a month, all suggestions being way below what FSPMI is 
arguing for. The demonstration was met with militant action by riot police who 
sought to quell the protests leaving many injured and nine FSPMI members 
requiring hospitalization (Good Electronics, 2009). Ultimately, the Riau 
Governor announced only a slight increase of minimum wages from 833,000 
rupiah (US$82) to 1,045,000 rupiah (US$103), suggesting the weak 
bargaining power of independent labour unions. The governor justified his 
meagre proposal by attributing it to the global economic crisis. Evidently, the 
needs and interests of foreign investors and employers were placed above 
the socio-economic rights of its workers. Investors have been known to leave 
the island due to workers wage uncertainties, moving their businesses to 
other South East Asian countries such as Thailand and Vietnam, where 
workers are generally paid between US$60 to 80 a month (Jakarta Post, 
2009, October 1). Batam workers are not immune to the forces of 
globalization and coupled with the existence of the international division of 
labour; it is hard to imagine their wages increasing exponentially anytime 
soon with more workers that can be exploited in regions such as China, 
Vietnam and Thailand. 
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From Nimble Fingers to Raised Fists? 
 
Ridwin Monoarfa, Vice President of the Federation of 
Indonesian Metal Workers‘Union (FSPMI) stands before a group 
of workers at a small hotel outside of Batam city limits. With one 
hand in the air and the other holding a microphone, he asks the 
workers to show him their fingers. ―One finger cannot do much 
on its own you see,‖ he says wiggling his fingers, ―but when your 
thumb and your finger work together, WOW, all of a sudden you 
can do things,‖ he picks up an imaginary pen in front of him. ―Let 
me see everyone‘s hands,‖ he instructs, ―let me see you try to 
push it up into the air,‖ the workers thrust open hands towards 
the ceiling, ―you don‘t feel anything do you?‖ people shake their 
heads. ―Now bring those individual fingers into a fist,‖ he says, 
―can you start to feel the power?‖ The crowd shouts 
enthusiastically, ―YES!‖ He punches the air, and the workers do 
the same. ―Can‘t you see that? Can‘t you see that change? If we 
are united, we are powerful. And if you unite into a union, you 
will feel that change.‖ 
(Peter, 2008:14) 
 
Illustration 6.1: FSPMI members at the Organizing Roadshow 
 
 
Source: Peter, 2008: 14 
 
Mills in her research on the labour movement in Thailand highlighted that the 
most militant and vocal protestors are young, rural migrant women. She 
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charted the women‘s subversion of essentialized notions of feminine passivity 
and compliance, ‗from nimble fingers to raised fists‘ (2005). In Indonesia 
however, despite the emergence of representation of workers from 
independent labour unions in Batam, female factory workers I interviewed are 
apprehensive about joining these organizations for fear of negative 
repercussions, mostly the fear of losing their jobs.  
 
However Crain (1994) argues that women are just as interested 
unionization as men when in fact, the problem lies in the unions‘ lack of 
experience with organizing female workers. Crain (1991) elaborates: 
 
‗…labour unions can be an effective, central tool in feminist 
agenda targeting the gendered structure of wage labour. 
Collective action is the most powerful and expedient route to 
female empowerment; further, it is the only feasible means of 
transforming our deeply gendered market and family structure.‘ 
(Crain, 1991: 1156) 
 
She further posits that ‗feminized labour unions‘ can politicize gender 
issues and seek the amelioration of female workers via collective bargaining 
and political lobbying. The innately democratic structure of labour unions 
should offer women the platform and the voice to lobby their issues. She 
argues that as a result of the feminization of labour, the feminization of unions 
has to follow suit. She critiques the traditional male-oriented structure of union 
organizing as unsuitable for mobilizing women as their strategies do not take 
into account their gendered marginalization and their aversion towards 
militant organizing tactics. Labour unions then attribute low female 
representation as a lack of interest.  
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Interestingly, labour unions in Batam themselves are recognizing the 
structural gendered differences in organizing female labour and are 
embarking on new strategies to mobilize the female working class. In 
addressing the needs of EPZ workers, FSPMI and Lomenik have 
independently set out strategies to increase women‘s participation at all levels 
of the union. FSPMI decided that in order to recruit more members, they had 
to involve more women as officers. This has helped them greatly to organize 
the majority women workers in the EPZs. Referring to a 2006 FSPMI 
Congress decision, the union‘s constitution was amended ensuring 30 per 
cent of women‘s participation at all levels of the unions.  
 
Lomenik however, highlights their strategy, in the case of their ‗Nora‘, 
conducting home visits to educate women workers on their rights and 
dispelling myths about unions: 
 
‗At the age of 30, Nora isn‘t your average EPZ worker. The 
eldest of four, she graduated from law school at the prestigious 
University of Andalas where she became interested in women‘s 
rights. She joined Lomenik a year ago and began to learn about 
the rights of workers and in particular the rights of women 
workers. Training from the union, coupled with her studies at 
university, led her to become an organizer for the union. ―Many 
of the workers here are women and many of them don‘t know 
their rights. There are cases where if they get pregnant they‘ll 
get sacked. I wanted to educate other women about their rights. 
Women were surprised to know they even had rights. I had to 
teach the women that being in an association is not violating any 
law, they are afraid they will lose their jobs if they join the union. 





Unions may have taken a leaf from Crain‘s idealized notion that a 
feminized union usually focuses on ‗building a nurturing community that can 
withstand and flourish in the face of inevitable employer antiunion pressure‘ 
(1991:1213). This style relies on establishing an emotional connection 
between employees as well as on intellectual commitments on the goals of 
the union; it requires more traditional strategies that are more personal in 
nature. Though this process may take longer, a more participatory, 
democratic structure will ensure that the women workers themselves can 
control their own unions. She posits that such efforts will produce a stronger 
coalition of workers.  
 
Analyzing the dynamics of the ‗feminization of unions‘ in EPZs such as Batam 
would be a possible future direction of research. Salient questions include: 
What is the organizational structure of these unions? What are the main 
issues that the organization is championing? Who are these unions 
representing? What is the ratio of female membership? What are their 
strategies for recruiting women workers in joining their unions? What types of 
tactics are employed to advance their objectives for women? Also, what are 
the reactions of male union members with regards to the feminization of the 
union? Would this lead to them feeling disenfranchised? 
 
Finally, looking to the future, improvements in labour standards and freedom 
will play an important part in ameliorating the conditions for workers. The 
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government should learn a lesson from Suharto‘s regime that the ―stick‖ 
approaches of repressing of labour movement and worker activism is futile 
and the government needs to seriously consider the rights of their workers 
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